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TILE AUTONOMY OF THE BANKER'S
OBLIGATION ON BANK DRAFTS AND
CERTIFIED CHEQUES
Benjamin Geva*
Toronto

A bank draft or certified cheque ("banker's instrument") is a negotiable instrument on which abank is obligated, used by apaying party inpayment toa creditor .
The issue explored in this article is the autonomy ofthe banker's obligation on the
banker's instrument, namely whether the payee-creditor may enforce it irrespective of the obligated bank's defences against the paying party, as well as of the
paying party's defences against the payee-creditor . From a doctrinal point of
view, the questions are whether the payee-creditor can be a holder in due course
(so as not to be subject to the obligated bank's defences against the paying party),
and whether jus tertii , that is, a defence based on rights ofa thirdparty (here the
paying party), is available to the obligated bankagainst a holdernot in due course.
This article answers thefirst question in the affirmative but provides only apartly
affirmative answer to the second . The conclusion is thus that as a holder in due
course the-payee-creditor takes the banker's instrumentfreefrom the obligated
bank's defences against thepaying party . At the same time, as a holder not in due
course, the payee-creditor holds the instrument subject to the obligated bank's
defences against thepaying party; regardless ofwhether thepaying partyjoins the
action ofthe payee-creditor against the obligated bank, the payee-creditor holds
the instrument subject also to thepaying party's claimfor the specific restitution
of the instrument. Contract defences of the paying party against the payeecreditor, other than the retroactive cancellation oftheir contract leading to such
a claimfor the restitution ofthe instrument, are not available to theobligated bank
against the payee-creditor. Autonomy is thus not entirely achieved.
Une traite bancaire ou un chèque certifié («titre bancaire») est un effet de
commerce qui engage la responsabilité de la banque et qui est utilisé par un
débiteurpourpayer son créancier. Cet article étudie leproblème de l'autonomie
de la respnsabilité du banquier en vertu de ce titre bancaire;plus précisément, il
examine la question de savoir si le créancier peut en exiger le paiement
indépendamment des défenses que la banque pourrait faire valoir vis-à-vis le
débiteur et celle des moyens de défense du débiteur vis-à-vis le créancier .

Sur leplan analytique, il s'agitdedéterminer si le créancierpeut être un détenteur
régulier (et ainsi ne pas être assujetti aux moyens de défense de la banque contre
le débiteur) et si un jus tertii , c'est-à-dire une défense fondée sur les droits d'un
tiers (en l'espèce, le débiteur), peut être invoqué par la banque contre quelqu'un
qui n'est pas un détenteur régulier . Cet article répond affirmativement à la
première question et apporte à la seconde une réponse qui n'estquepartiellement
affirmative . Ainsi, comme détenteur régulier, le créancier reçoit le titre bancaire
*Benjamin Geva, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario .
The research assistance of Erin O'Donovan is acknowledged with gratitude .
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libre des moyens de défense de la banque contre le débiteur. Cependant, si le
créancier n'est pas détenteur régulier, son titre bancaire reste assujetti aux
moyens de défense de la banque contre le débiteur. Que le débiteur soit ou non
partie au recours du créancier contre la banque, le créancier qui détient ce titre
bancaire demeure néanmoins exposé à une demande de restitution du titre par le
débiteur.Labanque nepeutpas invoquercontre le créancier les moyensdedéfense
basés sur le contrat entre le débiteur et le créancier, sauf ceux qui résultent de
l'annulation du contrat et qui mènent à la demande de restitution du titre . En
conséquence, l'autonomie complète du banquier n'existe pas .
Introduction
A banker's instrument can broadly be described as a payment instrument
governed by the Bills of Exchange Act (the "Act")' payable on demand, on
which a bank or another financial institution ("bank" or "banker") has incurred
liability to the holder. It is a mechanism for the transmission offunds between
individual as well as corporate debtors and creditors; it facilitates the avoidance
of the risk of physical carriage of money as well as gives the creditor the
assurance of payment in the form of the banker's credit attached to it?
In Canada, banker's instruments are eitherbank drafts or certified cheques .
Abankdraft is anorder topay asum ofmoney addressed byabankeitherto itself
or to another bank.' A certified cheque is a cheque 4 drawn by a customer on his
or her bank, marked by that bank to show that it is drawn by the person
purporting to draw it, that it is drawn upon an existing account with the drawee
and that there are sufficient funds to meet it; in fact, upon certification, funds
have been withdrawn from the drawer's account and placed in a suspense
account in anticipation ofthe certified cheque being presented for payment.'
In practice, a debtor will procure a banker's instrument by either paying
over the counter for it, orhaving his orher bank account debited for the amount .
Alternatively, a holder of a cheque may procure its certification at the drawee
(debtor's) bank. Either way, the creditor holds an instrument to which a
banker's credit is attached.

' R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4. The English (United Kingdom or Imperial) Act is the Bills of
Exchange Act, 1882 (U.K.), 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61, as am. The term "Anglo Canadian Act"
refers to both statutes .
2 Banker's instruments (first certified cheques followed by bank drafts) are accorded
priority (subject to secured creditors) upon the insolvency of a financial institution . See
sect. 31 of the Canadian Payments Association Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-21.
I
The bank money order is a species ofa bank draft. See B. Geva, Irrevocability of
Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and Money Orders (1986), 65 Can. Bar Rev . 107, at p.113.
4 As defined in the Act
in sec . 165(1) (Can.); 73 (U.K.).
' Whether the personal money order is a species of personal cheque or of certified
cheque is discussed in Geva, loc. cit., footnote 3, at pp. 130-145 . Since then, the American
UCChas sided withthe former view. See Prefatory Note (under"C.Benefits to the Banking
to Community") to Rev . (1990), UCC Article 3, and cf. §§ 3-411 and 3-412 .
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In a previous article ,6 I examined the irrevocability or binding effect ofthe
banker's engagement on the banker's instrument . I concluded that the banker's
obligation is binding towards the holder and is irrevocable 7 That is, the bank
signatory' to a banker's instrument ("the issuing bank" or "the obligated bank")
is liable to the holder either as a drawr'9 of a bank draft or as an acceptor'o of a
bank draft or certified cheque ." Nonetheless, whether the banker's obligation
is also absolute and autonomous, namely free from the bank's defences against
the customer, as well as fromthe customer's defences against his or her creditor,
was left open as an entirely different matter, outside the scope of that article.
The present article takes on where its predecessor stopped . That is, it
discusses the autonomy or the absolute nature of the banker's instrument, or
more specifically, ofthe banker's obligation on it. The precise issue is whether
the holder can enforce the banker's obligation irrespective of the banker's
defences against the customer, as well as of defences available to the customer
against the holder.
The following setting is quite typical . A buyer ("paying party") pays the
seller ("creditor") by means ofa banker's instrument. The obligated bankmay
attempt to refrain from payment either on the basis of its own defences or of
those ofthe paying party. 12 Upon the dishonour ofthe instrument, the question
is then whether the obligated bank may successfully defend the holder's action
on the basis of (i) the bank's own defences against the paying party, as for
example where the party has failed to pay for the banker's instrument," or (ii)
the paying party's defences against the creditor, as for example, where the
creditor has defrauded the paying party oris inbreach oftheir contract. Related
to this latter aspect is the question whether the paying party can enjoin the
obligated bank from making payment on the instrument on the basis of the
. cit., footnote 3.
'Loc
' The Anglo Canadian Act does not deal with banker's instruments as a specific
category. In contrast, Rev. (1990), UCC §§ 3-412 and 3-409 specifically provide forthe
liability (and hence the irrevocable obligation to the holder) of the issuer of a banker's
instrument as well as of the certifying bank.
$ For certification as signature, see Geva, loc . cit., footnote 3, at pp. 127-128 .
9
For the drawer's engagement underthe Act, see sec. 129(a) (Can.); 55(1)(a) (U.K.).
'° For the acceptor's engagement under the Act, see sec. 128(a) (Can.); 54(1) (U.K.).
" For judicial endorsement of this position with respect to certified cheques, see
particularly A.E. LePage Real Estate Services Ltd. v. Rattray Publications (1991), 5 O.R.
(3d) 216, atp. 218 (Ont. Gen. Div.). See also Re MaubachandBank ofNova Scotia (1987),
62 O .R. (2d) 220, at p. 221 (Ont. C.A.).
'z Much ofthe debate in the United States has been confused by placing it under the
misleading title ofthe obligated bank's right to stop payment. See, for example, annotation
by S .R. Shapiro, Uniform Commercial Code: Bank's Right to Stop Payment on Its Own
Uncertified Check or Money Order (1980), 97 A.L.R. (3d) 714 . But the real issue is the
availability of defences ; this has nothing to do with the right to stop (or countermand)
payment on a cheque under sec. 167 (Can.) or 75 (U.K.) of the Act .
'3
Thatis,in becoming obligated on a banker's instrument, the bankmay extend credit
to the paying party . As well, the paying party may also pay by personal cheque which is
subsequently dishonoured . Default by the paying party may be in conjunction with the
paying party's insolvency.
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paying party's defences against the creditor. Obviously, where the obligated
bank successfully avoids making payment to the holder, payment (in fact
reimbursement) ought to be made to the paying party .
Assuming good faith and a lack ofadverse knowledge on the holder's part,
equity considerations unequivocally support the holder's right to enforce
payment against the bank over the bank's own defences against the paying
party . However, where a breaching (or an allegedly breaching) creditor
purports to enforce payment against the bank over the paying party's defences,
thereby blocking the paying party's chance to obtain reimbursement from the
bank and forcing the paying partyto sue the creditor for damages resulting from
the breach, policy considerations are not that straightforward . On the one hand,
it has been argued that the banker's instrument is perceived as a substitute for
cash so that its holder ought not to be exposed but to a claimfor damages (in the
aftermath ofpayment) . '4 On the other hand, it was argued that cash equivalence
does not forfeit tracing or other equitable in rem remedies designed to seize
funds (as well as the means to get them) held by a fraudulent payee."
The Act doesnot deal directly with the subject. Some American courts have
attempted to deal with the autonomy ofthe banker's instrument by treating it as
establishing "a debtor-creditor relationship between the issuing bank and the
payee" . '6 In this context, it was stated that the banker's instrument "stands on
its own foundation as an independent, unconditional and primary obligation of
the ... [issuing] [b]ank"" and that "[t]o allow the bank to stop payment on such
an instrument would be inconsistent with the representation it makes in issuing
the ... [instrument]"." As one commentator put it, between payee and issuer,
"payee has a duty topresent the ... [instrument] and the right toreceive payment,
while ... [issuer] has a duty to pay the ... [instrument] upon presentment" . '9
Such views as to the autonomy or the absolute nature of the banker's
instrument are heavily influenced by the autonomy of the letter of credit . The
opening of the letter of credit by the account party generates a separate and
absolute engagement of the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary upon compliance with the terms of the letter of credit, irrespective of the account party's
claims and defences against the beneficiary under the contract paid for by the
'4 A leading proponent of this view is L. Lawrence, Making Cashier's Checks and
OtherBank Checks Cost-Effective : A Pleafor Revisionof Articles 3 and 4 ofthe Uniform
Commercial Code (1979-80), 64 Minn. L. Rev. 275, at p. 318 .
'5 P.M. Shupack, Cashier's
Checks, Certified Checks, and True Cash Equivalence
(1985), 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 467, at pp. 476-478.
'6 MoonOverthe MountainLtd . v.Marine MidlandBank,
386 N .Y.S. 2d974, at p. 975
(Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1976). Of course, such a direct relationship exists where the banker's
instrument is given to the payee in discharge of an obligation owed by the bank. See, for
example, Myers v. First National Bank ofScotia, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 204, at p. 206 (App. Div .
1973).
"Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F. 2d 395, at p. 400 (5th Cir., 1970).
'$National Newmark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 268 A. 2d 327, at p. 329 (Law Div .
N.J., 1970).
11 M.L. Cohen, Comment (1965-66),15 Buff. L. Rev. 193, at pp. 195-196.
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letter of credit2° Nonetheless, these views do not constitute a good analysis
under the law of negotiable instruments.
As explained below, the creditor's - freedom from the banker's defences
against the paying party hinges on the question of the payee as a holder in due
course . This issue is discussed below in Part I. The availability to the bank of
the paying party's defences against the creditor is aquestion ofjus tertii, namely
of the availability of third person's claims or defences to a party sued on a
negotiable instrument who has no claim or defence of his or her own. This issue
is discussedbelow in Part 11. In the final analysis, the question of the autonomy
of the banker's instrument thus becomes an exercise in the statutory interpretation of the Act which requires the resolution of some fundamental doctrinal
issues in the law of negotiable instruments.
The ultimate conclusion of this article is that a holder in due course holds
the instrument free from the banker's as well as from the paying party's claims
and defences . A payee of a banker's instrument taking it in good faith, for value
and without notice, may qualify as a holder in due course . Conversely, a
breaching creditor is not a holder in due course . The paying party's claims,
including those based on the retroactive cancellation of the obligation for which
the instrument was given (but no other contract defences) are available to the
bank as against the creditor .
I. The Issuing Bank's Defences Against the Paying Party:
Can the Payee-Creditor Be a Holder in Due Course?
Obviously, the banker's defences against the paying party/debtor cannot be
raised against a holder in due course. The latter "holds the ... [instrument] free
from any defect of title of prior parties, as well as from mere personal defences
available to prior parties among themselves and may enforce payment against
all parties liable on the ... [instrument]"." A holder in due course is a holder22
who has taken the instrument "complete and regular on the face of it", who
became the holder "before the ... [instrument] was overdue and without notice
that it had been .. .- dishonoured", and who took the instrument in good faith and
for value and without notice "at the time the . .. [instrument] was negotiated to
him" of "any defect in the title of the person who negotiated it"."
Taking by negotiation is thus one of theprerequisites forbecoming aholder
in due course .24 "Negotiation" ought to be distinguished from "issue"; while
2° For the autonomy of the letter of credit, see, for example, G.B . Graham and B. Geva,
Standby Credits in Canada (1984), 9 Can. Bus. L.J . 180, at pp . 190-205 .
2' Sec. 73(b) (Can.) ; sec. 38(2) (U .K .) . Here and elsewhere "instrument" substitutes
"bill", since the provisions governing bills apply to cheques and notes as well. See sec.
165(2) and 186 (Can.) or sec. 73 and 89 (U.K.) .
22 For the definition of "holder" see, infra, text around footnote 30 .
23
Sec. 55(1) (Can .) ; sec . 29(1) (U.K.) .
44 But see, St . Martin Supplies Inc. v. Boucley, [19691 C.S . 324, at p. 325 (Quebec),
holding that the subsection does notrequire taking by negotiation; rather, accordingto that
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"issue" is "thefirstdelivery of ... [an instrument], complete in form, to a person
who takes it as a holder", "negotiation" is the transfer of aninstrument from one
person to another "in such amanner as to constitute the transferee the holder of
the ... [instrument] 1) .25 While an instrument26payable to bearer is negotiated by
delivery, an instrument payable to order is negotiated "by the endorsement of
the holder"2' completed by delivery.28
Except for a certified cheque whose certification is procured other than by
the paying party (the drawer), a banker's instrument is usually first delivered by
the issuing bank to the paying party.29 "Holder" is defined to mean "the payee
or endorsee of . .. [an instrument] who is in possession of it, or the bearer
thereof '.3 o Thus, for the paying party inpossession ofa banker's instrument first
delivered to him" by the issuing bank to be "holder", the instrument must have
been made payable to the bearer. Alternatively, it must have been made payable
to the paying party. Otherwise, being neither the bearer nor the payee (as well
as the endorsee), the paying party in possession of a banker's instrument made
payable to his creditor is not its holder. Thus, as explained below, primafacie,
the delivery ofthe banker's instrument by the paying party to his creditor fulfils
the statutory requirements for "negotiation" onlywhere the banker's instrument
is payable to bearer or where it is payable to the paying party, but not where it
is payable to the paying party's creditor.
It was argued that the issue of an instrument payable to bearer, by means of
delivery, may also constitute negotiation so that its first bearer"may qualify as
aholder in due course." Regardless, delivery by the first bearer to a second one,
judgment, the subsection merely requires that if the bill were negotiated, to be a holder in
due course, the new holder must not have received notice ofa defect oftitle at the time of
the negotiation .
25 Sec. 2 (Can. as well as U.K.) ("issue") ; sec . 59(1) (Can.); sec . 31(1) (U .K .)
("negotiation") . (Emphasis added).
26 Sec . 59(2) (Can .) ; sec . 31(2) (U.K.) .
z' Sec. 59(3) (Can .) ; sec. 31(3) (U .K .) (where "indorsement" substitutes "endorsement") .
28 Sec . 2 (Can. as well as U.K.); sec. 31(3) (U .K .) . The modifying conditions in the
case of a cheque delivered to a bank for deposit into an account (for example, sec . 165(3)
(Can.) or the Cheques Act, 1957 (U .K .), 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 36) are outside the scope of the
present inquiry .
29
Where the issuing bank delivers the instrumentdirectly to the creditor ofthepaying
party, it does so on behalfofthe paying party. In theory we have then two deliveries: from
the issuing bank to the paying party, and from the paying party to the creditor.
3o Sec . 2 (Can. as well as U.K.; the latter uses "indorsee" rather than "endorsee").
s' Throughout this article, "him", includes "her" or "it"; "he" includes "she" or "it";
and "his" includes "hers" or "its". Otherwise, I aim at being gender neutral .
11 "Bearer" is defined in sec . 2 (Can. as well as U.K.) as "the person in possession of
a bill or note ... payable to bearer".
ss Cf. F.R. Malan, Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African
Law (1983), para. 114, arguing that "if a bill payable to bearer is delivered by the drawer
to the payee, the delivery will be not only an issue but also a negotiation" . In this quoted
language, the use ofthe word "payee" inconnection with abearer instrumentisunfortunate.
In any event, contrary to the statement in the accompanying text, it is more plausible to
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is negotiation. 34 This is so even where the second bearer is the payee of an
instrument payable to payee or bearer, as such an instrument is treated as
payable to bearer." Thus, the payee of a banker's instrument payable to payee
or bearer, to whom the instrument has been delivered by the paying party (the
latter being its first bearer/holder) may qualify as a holder in due course.3 6
Also, an endorsee inpossession ofan instrument payable to order is ataker
by negotiation . Accordingly, in connection with a banker's instrument made
payable to the paying party's creditor, an endorsee in possession of the
instrument may qualify as a holder in due course ." Furthermore, where the
banker's instrument was made to the order of the paying party/debtor, and
endorsed by him to his creditor, this creditor himself is a taker by negotiation,
capable of qualifying as a holder in due course.
However, a payee of an instrument payable to order is not a taker by
endorsementfrom the holder. Being the first holder ofthe instrument, the payee
takes the instrument neither by endorsement nor from aprevious holder. Rather
the payee appears" to be the person to whom the instrument is "issued" rather
than "negotiated ".39 The conventional interpretation of the Act is thus that a
payee may not be a holder in duecourse 40
So far, the inevitable conclusion appears to be that the banker's defences
against the paying party/debtor may be asserted against the creditor payee ofthe
banker's instrument. Not being a holder,in due course, the payee/creditor does
not hold the instrument "free from any defect oftitle of prior parties, as well as
from mere personal defences available to prior parties among themselves"41
argue that inasmuch as the "issue" of a bearer instrument does not involve a transfer
conferring a derivative title on a transferee, no "negotiation" is thereby carried out.
34 See, for example,
Golden Prism v . But-ShorInvestments & Distributors (Pty .) Ltd .,
[1978] 1 S.A. 512, at p. 515 AB (Durban and Coast Local Div.), for the negotiation from
an agent (the firstbearer) to a principal (the second bearer) so as to make the latter a holder
in due course.
3s
See, for example, Johnson v. Johnson, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 912 (Alta. A.D.).
36
See, for example, Commonwealth Trading Bank ofAustralia v . Sydney Raper Pty .
Ltd. (1975), 25 F.L .R. 217, at p. 245 (N.S .W.S.C.).
37
The collecting bank inwhich the banker's instrument is deposited may be covered .
3s
However, this appearance could be misleading. See the ensuing discussion in this
section.
39
For this distinction, see supra, text and footnotes 24-28 .
1See, for example, F.R. Ryder and A. Bueono, Byles onBills ofExchange (26thed.,
1988), pp. 38, 218 ; A.G. Guest, Chalmers and Guest on Bills ofExchange, Cheques and
Promissory Notes (14thed.,1991), p. 275 ; D.V. Cowenand L. Gehring, Cowen ontheLaw
of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa (4th ed., 1966), pp. 275-278 ; Malan, op. cit .,
footnote 33, para. 179; B. Conrick, MJL Rajanayagam's The Law ofNegotiable Instruments in Australia (2d ed., 1989), para. 9.8; B. Crawford, Crawford and Falconbridge
Banking and Bills ofExchange (8thed.,1986), Vol . 2, pp. 1474-1478, who is quite critical
ofthis interpretation . For aprevious critical view by this author, see B. Geva, Reflections
ontheNeed toRevise the Bills of Exchange Act (1981-82),6 Can. Bus. L.J. 260, atpp. 289301 . The most comprehensive and thorough critique is R.W. Aigler, Payees as Holders in
Due Course (1926-27), 36 Yale L.J. 608 .
11 See text supra, at footnote 21.

28

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol.73

Indeed, in Australia, Commonwealth Trading Bank ofAustralia v. Sydney
Raper Pty. Ltd.42 did not allow the payee of a banker's instrument to enforce it
against the issuing bank over the latter's defences against the paying party43
However, in that case, the instrument, though made payable to the payee or
bearer,' was crossed "notnegotiable", so as to allow transferability only subject
to defects inthe transferor's title.41 Furthermore, payee did not comply with the
taking for value requirement 46 As such, payee could not become aholder in due
course.47
Nonetheless, the decision alarmed the financial community. It was
feared that its implications might undermine the cash quality of the banker's
instrument .48 Ultimately, in response to the Law Society's request for "a
definitive statement from banks regarding the circumstances under which ...
[banker's instruments] will be dishonoured", the Australian Bankers' Association advised that:
Where there has been failure of consideration for the issue of a ... [banker's
instrument], the issuing bank may dishonour the ... [instrument] only if either :
- the holder has not given value for the ... [banker's instrument],49 or
- if the holder has given value, the holder had, at the time of giving value,
knowledge of the failure of consideration for the issue of the ... [banker's
instrument] so
42
Supra, footnote 36. See also Justin SewardPty. Ltd . v . Commissioners ofRural and
Industries Bank (1980), 60 F.L.R. 51 (W.A. Dist. CQ.
43 I
n Sydney Raper, ibid., the Australian issuing bank delivered the banker's instrument to the paying party in consideration for an American banker's instrument which was
subsequently dishonoured by the American issuing bank. There was thus failure (and not
absence as may beimplied from the judgment) ofconsideration for the Australian banker's
instrument from the paying party to the Australian issuing bank. Whether the American
bank was justified in dishonouring its banker's instrument is outside the scope ofthe present
inquiry. We are concerned with the enforceability of the Australian banker's instrument,
against the Australian issuing bank, where the consideration from the paying party to the
Australian issuing bank failed (due to the dishonour of the American banker's instrument) .
44
For the significance of this practice, see text, supra, around footnotes 32-36 .
4s
Under the corresponding section to sec . 174 (Can.) and sec . 81 (U.K.). Neither "not
negotiable" (or any other) crossing northepractice ofpayment instruments issued to payee
or bearer is prevalent in Canada.
46
For this requirement, see text, supra, around footnotes 22-23 .
47
See primarily supra, footnote 36, at pp. 240-242 (judgment of Glass J.A.).
48
The fears were not universally shared. See, for example, W.S. Weerasooria, The
Australian Bank Cheque - Some Legal Aspects (1975-76),2 MonashU.L. Rev . 180, at pp.
187-189 ; R. Makim, The Australian Bank Cheques - Some FurtherLegal Aspects (1976
77), 3 Monash U.L. Rev. 66, at p. 68. Both emphasized, albeit without any doctrinal
reasoning, that Commonwealth TradingBank ofAustralia v . SydneyRaperPty . Ltd., supra,
footnote 36, does not affect the position of a holder who took the banker's instrument in
good faith and for value .
49 In
the context of holder in due course requirements, "value" means executed
consideration of quidpro quo ; executory consideration, such as apromise, willnot suffice .
See, for example, Cowen and Gehring, op. cit., footnote 40, pp. 283-285 .
so See N. Mainwaring, Dishonouring Bank Cheques (1985), 25 L. Soc . J. 430 . Other
ground for dishonour were stated to be forgery or counterfeiting, material alteration, or
advice of theft or loss. These grounds are outside the scope of the present inquiry.
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Stated otherwise, a payee taking the instrument in good faith and for value is
protected .
Being consistent with the cash quality of the banker's instrument, this
solution is quite attractive. However, this is a pragmatic solution with no
doctrinal underpinning . Rather than being based on law, it is based on the
goodwill of the banking community.
In the United States, under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a
payee may be a holder in due course. The predecessor ofArticle 3, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law ("N.I.L.") contained statutory language similar to
that ofthe Act. Itthus required the holder in due course to take by negotiation ,51
and defined "negotiation" of an instrument payable to order in terms of the
endorsementbyaprevious holder." Original Article 3 abandoned this language
by setting out that a holder in due course must take the instrument for value, in
good faith and without notice of adverse facts ,53 but need not necessarily take
it by negotiation . Furthermore, original paragraph 3-302(2) explicitly stated
that "[a] payee may be a holder in due course". Specific examples given by the
Comment included that of payment by banker's instrument. 54
Revised Article 3 follows its predecessor in not requiring the holder in due
course to take by negotiation ." Original paragraph 3-302(2), specifying that a
payee may be a holder in due course, has been omitted as superfluous . 6 The
Official Comment specifically refers to the banker's instrument scenario as a
typical setting where a payee may be a holder in due course s7 In any event,
under revised Article 3, the delivery of a banker's instrument payable to the
creditor, by the paying party to the creditor, is treated as "negotiation" ."
N.I .L., sec . 52(4). For the corresponding provision under the Act, see text, supra,
around footnote 3.
52 Ibid., sec . 30. For the corresponding provision under the Act, see the text, supra,
around footnotes 6-8.
53
pre 1990 UCC, § 3-302(1).
54
Comment 2, illustrations (a) and (b) (pre 1990 UCC § 3-302) .
55
Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-302(2).
56 See
Official Comment 4 to Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-302. In the view ofthe drafters
such a provision may also be misleading since "use of the holder-in-due-course doctrine
by the payee ... is not the normal situation".
51
See Case#1 inOfficial Comment 4to Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-302, combining the two
illustrations referred to, supra, footnote 54.
58
See Rev . (1990), UCC § 3-201 whose predecessor, pre 1990 UCC § 3-202(1), was
somewhat ambiguous; thereunder, negotiation ofan instrumentpayable to order was stated
to b6 "by delivery with any necessary indorsement". (Emphasis added). Under Rev.
(1990), UCC § 3-201(a), the negotiation ofa banker's instrumentby the paying partytothe
payee is sui generis . Under Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-105(a) (as it was under its predecessor
pre 1990UCC § 3-102(1)(a)), the delivery ofthebanker's instrumentpayable to the paying
party's creditor by the issuing bank to the paying party qualifies as the "issue" of the
instrument. For the "negotiation" and "issue" under the Act, see the text, supra, around
footnotes 24-28. For the application ofthese concepts to the_banker's instrumentunder the
Act, see the text, supra, the text around footnotes 29-40.
5'
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It should be pointed out that to defeat a claim or defence, the holder in due
course must be a remote, not immediate, party vis-d-vis the one raising that
claim or defence 59 Thus, vis-d-vis a prior party, only a remote party could
become a holder in due course. Two parties in privity with each other are
immediate parties . Otherwise, they are remote parties .b° A payee is usually an
immediate party vis-d-vis the maker or drawer ; an endorsee is a remote party in
relation tothe maker ordrawer . By conferring a derivative title to the instrument
on the transferee, negotiation is thus a machinery generating the required
remoteness between the party preceding the transferor and the transferee (for
example, between the drawer or maker and the first endorsee) . However, in a
bill of exchange, the payee is a remote party vis-d-vis the acceptor, though the
bill has not been negotiated to him . Such "remoteness" is adequate to make the
payee aholder in due course vis-d-vis the acceptor under the UCC; primafacie,
it appears to fall short of satisfying the taking by negotiation requirement (and
hence, the holding in due course standard) under the Anglo-Canadian Act."
Nevertheless, it can be argued that notwithstanding what appears to be clear
statutory language to the contrary, 62 the payee of a banker's instrument may be
treated under the Anglo-Canadian Act as one who has taken the instrument by
negotiation . Underlying this interpretation of the Act is the proposition that
unlike a usual payee, the payee of a banker's instrument is a remote party visd-vis the issuer. Such a payee has a derivative title to the instrument conferred
upon him by the paying party. Indeed, the rights to and on the instrument ofthe
remitter, namely someone who procures or purchases" from an issuer an
instrument payable to another" who has not transferred the instrument yet, go
back to the law merchant and early English law.61 Not being a holder, the

19Theholder indue course is insulated onlyfrom claims and defences of prior parties .
See provision supra, footnote 21.
so Persons are "immediate parties" where they are in direct relation with each other;
that is, "if their legal relations as parties to an instrument arise out oftheir direct dealings
with eachother" . All otherparties are "remote". See Crawford, op. cit., footnote 40, p.1519
and Guest, op. cit., footnote 40, p. 225 .
61 For a historical and doctrinal perspective on the payee's position vis-d-vis the
acceptor, see infra, footnotes 149-154 .
62 See text supra, around footnotes 24-28 and further amplified text, supra, around
footnotes 29-40.
63 Inasmuchas the remitter has an original and not derivative titleto the instrument(see
text, infra, at footnote 65), the use ofthe word"purchase", though quite common, may be
misleading in this context .
64 For this term, see, for example, Munroe v . Bordier (1849), 8 C.B. 862, at pp . 871872,137 E.R. 747, at p. 751 (C.P.). "Remitter" is currently defined in Rev . (1990), UCC
§ 3-103(11). as "a person who purchases an instrument from its issuer if the instrument is
payable to an identified person other than the purchaser". There is no corresponding
provision in the Act.
65 For a comprehensive and thorough study, see F.K. Beutel, Rights of Remitters and
Other Owners notwithinthe TenorofNegotiable Instruments (1927-28),12 Minn. L. Rev.
584.
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remitter is best viewed as the first owner ofthe instrument.66 The paying party
procuring a banker's instrument payable to his creditor is such a remitter, having
power to recover onthe instrument as well as to transfer it, particularly67 to the
payee (thepaying party's creditor). Itis in this sense thatthe payee ofabanker's
instrument procured by a remitter is a remote party vis-d-vis its issuer, with a
derivative title to the instrument, conferred to him by the payingparty/remitter .
Indeed, the delivery of a banker's instrument from the paying party to the
creditor is not "the first delivery" of the instrument so as to constitute its issue ."
Rather, it is the transfer ofan existing instrument from oneperson to another "in
such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the ... [instrument]"
so as to fall into the broad definition of "negotiation" ." True, there are two
subsections providing what constitutes "negotiation" . The first deals with the
negotiation of an instrument payable to bearer. The second deals with the
negotiation of an instrument payable to order, requiring it to be "by the
endorsement of the holder"" rather than that ofthe remitter. These subsections
should, however, be taken as providing examples for the most common
situations of "negotiation" rather than circumventing or restricting the broad
definition of "negotiation" . That is, the two subsections should not be taken to
exhaust all cases of "negotiation" . Accordingly, there is room for more
instances of "negotiation" not provided for by the two subsections, which are
nonetheless within the broad concept of "negotiation" as a transfer (rather than
an issue) to a holder."
A few pre-Act cases in England regarded the payee who took a bill of
exchange in good faith and for value from a remitter" as a bona fide holder for
66
See, for example, W.E. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes (2nd ed.,
1961), p. 179, where the author goes on to explain that the remitter may wish to exercise
ownership rights where the payee rejects the instrument, or where the remitter (in
possession of the instrument) chooses to transfer if to someone other than the payee.
67
But not exclusively . The remitter may effectively transfer the instrument to
someone other than the payee, and will use this power upon changing his mind, or the
rejection ofthe instrument by the payee, ibid. The substitute payee is unlikely to take the
instrument "regular on the face of it" (see, supra, the text around footnote 23), and thus
disqualifies as a holder in due course.
68
See text, supra, around footnote 24. Note, however, that technically speaking,
unlike under the UCC (see, supra, footnote 58), under the statutory language oftheAct, a
banker's instrument is never "issued", sincethe"first delivery" ofthe instrument (from the
issuer to the remitter) is not to a holder. Practically speaking, this "first delivery"from the
issuer to the remitter is the equivalent of "issue" .
69 See text, supra, around footnote 25.
'° See text, supra, around footnotes 26-28. (Emphasis added) .
" For a discussion, see Note, R. Windham (1927), 3 Camb. L.J. 84. Se e also, F.K.
Beutel, Beutel's Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law (7th ed., 1948), pp. 675-676, with
a subsequent case law discussion (from an American pre UCC perspective) ; note that the
N.I.L. statutory scheme was substantially identical to that currently under the AngloCanadian Act. See text, supra, around footnotes 51-52.
71 But not from_thepayee's agent. See, for example, De Bras v. Forbes (1792),1 Esp .
116,170 E.R. 298 (C.P.), specifically distinguished on that ground in Munroe v. Bordier,
supra, footnote 64, at pp. 870 (C.B.), 750-751 (E.R.).
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Value73 who may recover from the drawer/issuer notwithstanding the failure of
consideration given by the remitter to the drawer/issuer .74 The leading case is
Munroe v. Bordier 75 Wilde C.J. observed that the ordinary course of dealing
with a bill procured or purchased 71 by a remitter" "begins by the sale ofthe bill
by the drawer to some person other than the payee" so that thatperson, namely
the remitter '71 "should have a right to confer a title to the bill uponthe payee" .79
Having thus established the payee's derivative title, Wilde C.J. went on to
decide on the facts ofthe case that the remitters actually delivered the bill to the
payees "who received it bonafide, and for value". $° He thus concluded "that the
[payees] acquired a good title to the bill, and may sue the drawers upon it,
although ... [the drawers] have never received value for it ... [from the
remitters]" .8' Also in Poirier v. Morris ,8z under similar circumstances, payees
were regarded as "bona fide holders for value".83 Finally, in Watson v. Russell, 84
the payee, who took a cheque from aremitter" for "value without notice 1186 was
entitled to prevail over the drawer .
The argumentthatunderpre-Act case law the payee could beaholder indue
course is bolstered by the Indian Negotiable Instruments Act.87 The statute,
73 For the equivalency between this
term and "holder in due course" (notwithstanding
Malan, op. cit., footnote 33, para. 179), see text, infra, around footnotes 101 and 109.
'^ For this interpretation of these cases, see particularly Aigler, loc . cit., footnote 40,
atpp. 609-611 ; Crawford, op. cit., footnote 40, p.1477 (and see text, supra, around footnote
30) ; Malan, ibid .
's Supra, footnote 64.
'6
See, supra, footnote 63.
" On the facts of the case, the remitter was required to place funds with the issuer a
day after the issue ofthe instrument and its subsequent delivery to the payee. However, the
remitter failed prior to making payment to the issuer. This transaction reflected the
contemporary mercantile practice in London for foreign bills of exchange.
'8
More specifically, the judgmentdidnot identify the remitter as the person "to confer
atitle ... upon the payee" ; rather, the courtsaidthe transaction was not such "that no person
but the drawer should have a right to confer title to the bill upon the payee" . Practically
speaking, this singles out the remitter as the person to confer such a title.
'9
Munroe v . Bordier, supra, footnote 64, at pp. 872 (C.B.), 751(E.R.). In making this
statement, Wilde C.J. explicitly relied on classical authorities, that is, Beawes's Lex
Mercatoria, Bills of Exchange, para. 6, p. 416, citing Marius, p. 22.
8°
Ibid., at pp. 873 (C.B.), 752 (E.R.).
8i
Ibid. As indicated supra, footnote 77, the remitter failed prior to providing the
consideration to the issuing drawers .
82 (1853), 2 EL. & BL. 89, 118 E.R. 702 (Q.B.).
83
Ibid ., at pp. 104, 107 (EL. & BL.), 708, 709 (E .R.).
84 (1864),5 B. & S. 968,122 E.R. 1090(Ex . Ch.), aff'g. (1862), 3 B. & S. 34,122 E.R.
14 (Q.B.).
8s
Nonetheless, in thatcase, thedrawer was a subcharterer ofthe ship from the remitter
(the charterer) and the cheque was in payment ofthe remitter-charterer'shire to the owner's
shipbroker. This facilitated a narrower interpretation ofthis case. See text, infra, around
footnotes 117-119 .
86 Supra, footnote 84, at pp. 969 (B. & S.), 1091 (E.R.) (Ex . Ch.).
8'
Act XXVI of 1881 (as am. up to March 1989). For Indian law update, I am grateful
to Professors Menon and Rao of the National Law School of India University.
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passed in 1881, one year before the Imperial Bills ofExchange Act, was stated
to be "based upon the English common law relating to promissory notes, bills
of exchange and cheques" so as to constitute "mainly a codification of the
English common law on the subject" ." Under section 9 of the Indian Act, a
holder in due course must have taken the instrument for consideration, before
it became overdue and without notice of any defect "in the title of the person
fromwhomhederivedhistitle" . Withrespecttoaninstrument payable toorder,
the holder in due course could be "the payee or indorsee thereof", provided the
foregoing conditions have been met . As under the English and Canadian
statutes,s9 "negotiation" under the Indian Act is a transfer to a holder9° and an
instrument payable to order "is negotiable by the holder by endorsement and
delivery" ;91 nonetheless, underthe Indian Act, while aholder in due course must
have a derivative title, such a title, strictly speaking; need not be acquired by
"negotiation",92
Unfortunately, the eligibility ofthe payee to be a holder in due course is not
dealt with directly byChalmers' pre-Act edition ofhis treatise.93 Attempting "to
state methodically the law as it is",94 Chalmers nevertheless appears to overlook
the specific point. Indeed, he recognized, on the basis of Watson v. Russell,95
that there are circumstances where the maker and the payee of a note are
remote parties96 He further acknowledged on the basis ofMunroe v. Bordier9'
as well as Watson v. Russell that a payee taking the instrument from a remitter9$
is a holder for value so that "[i]t is immaterial that there is no consideration
between .. . [the issuer] and . . . [the remitter], or that the consideration fails" .99
Nonetheless, he did not expand on the defence-free position of the remote
payee; nor did he articulate its underlying theory. 1oo At the same time,
11M.S. Parthasarathy, J.S. Khergamvala on the Negotiable Instruments Act (17th ed.,
1990), p. 1.
89 See
text, supra, around footnotes 24-28 .
90 Sec. 14.
91 Sec. 46.
92
See, supra, text that follows footnote 88.
93 M
.D. Chalmers, A Digest of the Law ofBills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and
Cheques (1878). The treatise is currently in its 14th edition (Guest, op . cit., footnote 40).
94
Ibid., p. vi.
9s See,
supra, text around footnotes 84-86 .
9s
Chalmers, op. cit., footnote 93, p. 74 (illustration 2). This illustration was also
included in p. 101 of the 13th edition (D .A.L. Smout, ed. (1964)), before the text was
completely rewritten as the 14th edition by Guest, c.f. Guest op. cit., note 40, p. 227 .
97
Supra, footnote 64 (see also, supra, text around footnotes 72-81).
91
It is implicit that taking was for value and in good faith.
99
Chalmers, op. cit., footnote 93, p. 69 (illustration 3). This illustrationwas alsoincluded
at p. 89 ofthe 13th edition . As for the 14th edition c.f. Guest, op. cit., footnote 40, p. 339.
goo I
n this author's view, these omissions led to an unnecessary confusion obscuring
doctrine relating to the holder for value, consideration and absence ofconsideration inthe
law ofbills and notes, as expressed, for example,inDiamond v. Graham, [1968] 1 W.L.R.
1061(C.A.). For theview that the latter was actuallyapayee as aholder in due course case,
see B. Geva, Absence ofConsideration inthe Law of Bills and Notes (1980), 39 Camb. L.J.
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Chalmers' definition of the "bona fide holder for value without notice", the
forerunner of the holder in due course,'°1 is that of "a holder for value who, at
the timehe becomes the holder and gives value, is really and truly without notice
ofany facts which, ifknown, would defeat his title to the [instrument]" . 102 This
definition does not require taking by negotiation ; it is thus broadenough to cover
the payee. Infact, the "bona fide holderfor value without notice" is not required
even to have a derivative title! 101
There is no indication that the drafters of the Imperial Bills ofExchange Act
specifically purported to overrule earlier case law allowing the payee to be a
holder in due course. However, in the landmark case of Bank ofEngland v.
Vagliano Bros.," Lord Herschell was of the opinion that pre-Act case law was
irrelevant inthe interpretation ofthe provision ofa codifying statute such as the
Imperial Bills of Exchange Act." Rather"
The proper course is in the firstinstance to examine the language ofthe statute and to
ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluencedby any considerations derived from the
previous state ofthe law, and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood,
and then, assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the
words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view.
Against the specific statutory languagerequiring the holderin duecourse to take
by negotiation, and the definition ofnegotiation of instrument payable to order
as the endorsement of the holder completed by delivery, it seems hard to argue
that pre-Act cases permitting the payee to qualify as a holder in due course
survived the passage of the Act.
Nonetheless, in the final analysis, this objection based on Vogliano is not
valid. Thus, the proposed interpretation ofthe Act as encompassing "negotiation" by the nonholder-remitter to the payee'°' is not based on the technical
argument as to the admissibility of pre-Act cases . Rather, it is driven by the
desire to readthe Act as accommodating the payee who has taken the instrument
from a remitter. That is, underlying the proposed interpretation are policy
objectives and not a restrictive outlook purporting to interpret a codifying
statute as much as possible in line with prior case law. Lord Herschell's
objection to the admissibility of pre-Act cases must be taken to apply only to
360, at pp. 368-369, as well as B. Geva, Financing Consumer Sales and Product Defences
in Canada and the United States (1984), pp. 150-151 .
1°1 For the interchangeability of these two terms see, for example, M.D. Chalmers,
A
Digest ofthe Law of Bills ofExchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques (3d ed.,1887), pp.
102-103. See also, infra, text around footnote 109.
1°z Chalmers, op. cit., footnote 93, p. 71.
101 Cf., infra, text around footnotes
149-153 .
104 [18911
A.C. 107 (H.L.).
"'But accordingto Fletcher Moulton L.J. inLloyd'sBankLtd. v. Cooke, [1907] 1 K.B.
794, at p. 807 (C.A.), "there is a strong presumption against any serious change in the
general law being intended" by a codifying statute.
106 Supra, footnote 104, at pp. 144-145 .
107 See, supra, the text around footnotes 68-71 .
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such a restrictive use ofpriorcase law. In our situation, pre-Act cases reinforce
an interpretation which would have been put forward irrespective of them.
Confirmation of the proposed statutory interpretation and the continued
force of pre-Act cases upholding the payee's eligibility to become a holder in
due course comes from observations made by Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Lloyd's
Bank Ltd. v. Cooke."' First, he was satisfied that "the term `holder in due
course', which is used in the Act, is intended to be the equivalent of the term
`bona fide holder for value' which was used prior to the Act, and which would
... have included a payee who hadgiven full value for the bill or note in good
faith" .'o9 He could not see any indication that the Act was designed to introduce
any change regarding this point.
Second, in connection with an instrument payable to order, he declined to
construe the word "negotiated" as being merely equivalent to "indorsed".
Rather, on the basis of the general statutory definition of "negotiation" as a
transfer to a holder,"' "it appears clear that the Legislature intended to make it
apply also to the original operation of transferring the bill to the payee"; this is
so since the definition "carefully abstains from prescribing that the transferor
must be a `holder"'.' 1' His ultimate conclusion was "that the Act did not intend
toimpair theposition ofthepayee as contrasted withthatof an indorsee, andthat
a payee who has given value in good faith is intended to come within its
provisions as a `holder in due course' just as much as an indorsee" .' 12
R.E. Jones Ltd. v. Waring and Gi 'low,Ltd. 113 is the leading authority forthe
proposition that under the Act a payee may not be a holder in due course . 114 In
their judgments, several law lords explicitly disapproved of Fletcher Moulton
L.J.'s views in Lloyd's BankLtd. v. Cooke. 115 However, inJones v. Waring, the
House ofLords refrained from explicitly reversing the pre-Actremitter cases. 116
In fact, only Watson v. Russell'" was discussed. In distinguishing it, the law
lords regarded the intermediary who had taken the cheque from the drawer and
delivered it to the payee, not as a remitter but, rather, as the drawer's agent. 118
According to this interpretation, having failed to communicate to the payee a
ios Supra, footnote 105. This was a case of unauthorized completion of a blank
instrument by an intermediary (and nota remitter case). The otherjudges held forthepayee
on the basis of estoppel rather than the holder in due course doctrine.
109 Ibid., at p . 806 .
See, supra, the text around footnotes 25-28, 68-71 .
111 Supra, footnote 105, at p. 808 .
112

Ibid.
[1926] A .C . 670 (H.L .) .
114 See sources set out, supra, in footnote 40.
115 Supra, footnote 113, at pp. 680 (Viscount Cave), 687
113

(Lord Shaw), and 699 (Lord
Carson).
116 See, supra, the text around footnotes 72-86 .
117
See, supra, the text around footnotes 84-86 .
111 Supra, footnote 85 . With respect, this interpretation seems to beinconsistent atleast
with the understanding of the case by the Exchequer Chamber, which was the highest court
dealing with the matter . It further overlooks Crompton J.'s broad statement in trial (supra,
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condition subsequent to payment, stipulated by the drawer and communicated
by him to the intermediary but not the payee, the intermediary bound his
principal (thedrawer) unconditionally to the payee.' I9 Monroe v. Bordier 120 was
not even mentioned by the law lords .
There is pre Jones v. Waring Canadian authority upholding the holder in
due course position ofa payee taker from a remitter. 121 It should not necessarily
be assumed that such authority was overruled by Jones v. Waring . In effect,
since Jones v. Waring, the position of the payee taker from a remitter has not
formed the ratio of any leading authority . Furthermore, since the passage ofthe
Act, pre-Act remitter cases have not been specifically reversed . 122 Nor has the
proposed interpretation of the Act, as accommodating the holder in due course
status of the payee taker from a remitter, 12' been explicitly rejected . 124
Three leading cases denying the payee's holder in due course status under
the Act will now be examined in the order in which they were decided . InLewis
v. Clay, 121 a co-maker ofa promissory notedefended the payee's action pleading
fraud perpetrated by the other co-maker . Payee and defendant co-makers were
in direct privity. As such they were immediate parties so that payee could not
become a holder in due course. 126 In Herdman v. Wheeler, 12' an intermediary
was instructed by the maker to procure a loan in a specific amount from the
payee to the maker. The intermediary inserted a higher sum on the pre-signed
blank promissory note he had received from the maker, and delivered the
completed instrument to the payee. Having received the money fromthe payee,
footnote 84, at pp. 38 (B. & S.), 16 (E.R.)), not referring to the intermediary as the drawer's
agent:
"If A., by means of a false pretence ... procures B. to give him a note or cheque or
acceptance in favour of C., to whom he pays it, and who receives bona fide for value, B.
remains liable .. ."
30).

Cf. Crawford, op. cit., footnote 40, p. 1477 (and see also, supra, text around footnote

"I
See, for example, supra, footnote 105, at pp. 682 (Viscount Cave), 687 (Lord
Shaw), and 693-695 (Lord Summer) .
120
See, supra, the text around .footnotes 72-81 .
'21
Gunn'sLtd. v. Wark (1923), 51 N.B.R. 292, at pp. 300-301 (C.A.), where Watson
v. Russell, as understood by Chalmers (see supra, the text around footnote 96) was
followed. In this case, a buyer from a retailer paid for the goods, at the retailer's request,
by means of a promissory note payable to the manufacturer (the retailer's creditor) . The
payee-manufacturer was held to be a holder in due course, holding the note free from the
buyer's defences against the retailer. Other pre Jones v. Waring Canadian authorities
holding that the payee can be a holder in due course are complied in F. Read (ed .),
MacLaren's Bills, Notes and Cheques (6th ed., 1940), p. 196 .
"2
., supra, the text around footnotes 117-120.
But cf
123
See, supra, the text around footnotes 68-71 .
124
But cf., supra, the text around footnote 115 .
its (1897), 77 L.T. 653 (Q.B.D.).
126 I
n effect, defendant co-maker successfully pleaded non estfactum . However, the
holder in due course issue was also considered by the court as an alternative ground .
127
[190211 K.B. 361 (K.B.).
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theintermediary pocketed the excess proceeds. Allowing the makerto raise the
defence of unauthorized completion of the note by the intermediary, the court
in effect foundthat payee dealt directly withthe makerand thus there was privity
ofcontract betweenthem. "$ InJones v. Waring,129 the payeetook acheque from
an intermediary who had fraudulently procured it from the drawer by inducing
himto make it payable to the payee for a consideration allegedby the fraudulent
intermediary to be given to the drawer by the payee. In fact the intermediary
used the cheque to pay his own personal debt to the payee. - ®n his part, the
drawer thought he was dealing directly with the payee. 130
In all three cases, the payee did not have a derivative title to the instrument
and thus could not become a holder in due course . Unfortunately, the rhetoric
of some of the judgments went beyond the particular facts of respective cases .
Thus, in Lewis v. Clay, Lord Russell C.J. treated the holder in due course and
the named payee as two mutually exclusive categories . He observed that "the
plaintiff.. . [was] named aspayee .. . and, therefore, ... [was] one ofthe immediate
parties", so that the note "[had], in fact, never been negotiated". 111 This appears
to suggest the existence of an irrebuttable presumption under which the payee
is always an immediate party incapable of becoming a holder in due course . In
Herdman v. Wheeler, Channell J. was "not prepared to hold that a payee . .. can
neverbeaholder in due course"; 132 whether"the payee . .. may be aholder in due
course .. . depends upon the actual state of facts as between him and the
maker" . 133 Nonetheless, he specifically stated that "negotiated" meant "transferred by one holder to another" . I" Finally, in Jones v. Waring, Viscount Cave
expressed the view that the term "holder in due course" does not include the
originalpayee . 131 He,Lord Shaw andLord Carson"' specifically preferred Lord
Russell's view inLewis v. Clay 137 over that of Fletcher 1Vloulton L .J. in Lloyd's
Bank v. Cooke ."l
Falconbridge was of the opinion that Jones v. Waring "appears to be open
to criticism, as being based on technical and not wholly convincing reasoning,
at p. 374 .
Supra, footnote 113 .
130 A point stressed by Aigler, loc. cit., footnote 40, at p . 619 . Nonetheless, payee
intended todeal with theremitter. It is thus not entirely clearwhether the decision (though
distinguishable in part) is totally consistent with the pre-Act remitter cases (discussed,
supra, footnotes 72-86) . Cf. Crawford, op. cit., footnote 40, p. 1477 .
131 Supra, footnote 125, at p. 656. (Emphasis added) .
132 Supra,
footnote 127, at p. 372.
133 Ibid., at p. 374.
134 Ibid ., at p. 376. (Emphasis added). Technically, the decision was limited to the
proviso of sec. 20 (U.K.), corresponding to sec. 31(1) (Can.), dealing with the holder's in
due course power to overcome the defence of unauthorized completion . However, the
observations as to what constitutes "negotiation" apply across the board.
135 Supra, footnote 113, at p. 680.
136 Ibid. . at pp. 680, 697 and 699 respectively .
137 See, supra, the text around footnote 131.
131 See, supra, the text around footnotes 108-112 .
121
129

Ibid.,
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and as reaching a conclusion which is not entirely satisfactory from the practical
point of view, because there are situations in which the payee should logically
be as fully protected as a subsequent holder" . '39 In any event, all three cases
would be regarded as limited to theirown facts and not affecting the position of
apayee taker from a remitter. Indeed, disapproval of Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke in
Jones v. Waring was made in passing, and without thorough analysis. Moreover, Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke was not a remitter case, '4° and Fletcher Moulton
L.J. used language that might betoo broad in implying that a payee taking from
the drawer may also qualify as a holder in due course. '41 Accordingly,
notwithstanding Jones v. Waring, a payee taker from a remitter should be
regarded as eligible to become a holder in due course. The alternative of
explaining the pre-Act remitter cases as establishing the payee's defence-free
position on the basis of the payee's status, not as a holder in due course but as
a mere bona fide holder for value, '42 is quite untenable. '43 It is historically
erroneous 144 and doctrinally unfounded ."
Nonetheless, the drawer of a cheque whose certification is subsequently
procured by the holder is not a remitter. 146 The payee ofsuch a cheque, though
a remote party to the transaction between the certifying drawee and the drawer,
is not a taker from the remitter . Could such a payee qualify as a holder in due
course so as to hold the cheque free from defences available to the certifying
drawee against the drawer? On policy grounds, the question ought to be
answered in the affirmative ;substantively, such a payee's position is no different from thatof apayee taker from a remitter . '41 Accordingly, certification must
be regarded as the issuance of a new banker's instrument with the drawer being
regarded as the remitter, notwithstanding the genesis of the instrument as an
ordinary cheque . '4s
"v See

A.W. Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking and Bills ofExchange (7th ed.,1969),
pp. 625-626. See alsoCrawford, op. cit., footnote 40, p.1476. Crawford argues, ibid., pp.
1475-1476, that under "modern concepts of jurisprudence and the administration of
justice" the Supreme Court of Canada is not necessarily bound by Jones v. Waring.
Falconbridge's position side by side with other scholarly adverse views onJones v. Waring
affected its disapproval in Lacasse v. Gratton, [1963] C.S. 69 (Quebec), as well as in St.
Martin Supplies Inc. v. Boucley, [1969] C.S. 324, at pp. 325-326 (Quebec). Jones v.
Waring also was not followed in CanadianBank ofCommerce v. B.C. Interior Sales Ltd.
(1957), 9 D.L.R. (2d) 363, at p. 369 (B.C.S.C.), as well as in Dominion Bank v. Fassel &
Baglier Construction Co., [1955] O.W.N. 709, at p. 711 (Ont. C.A.); Silberberg v.
Menaker, [1955] C.S. 352, at p . 353 (Quebec) ; Central Factors Corp. v. Bragg (1977), 76
D.L.R. (3d) 585, at p. 587 (B.C.S.C.), albeit without specific reference (in the last three
cases) . Nonetheless, Canadian courts felt bound by Jones v. Waring, for example in
Johnson v . Johnson, supra, footnote 35; Gallagher v. Murphy, [1928] 4 D.L.R. 618, at p.
623 (Ont. A.D.), rev'd . on other grounds, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 124 (S.C.C.); Duplain v.
Cameron (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 348, at p. 363 (S.C.C.); and more recently, for example,
in Niagara Finance Co. v. Avco Financial Services Ltd. (1974), [1975] 2 W.W.R. 352, at
p. 355 (Alta.D.C.);RoyalBankofCanada v.Pentagon ConstructionMaritimeLtd . (1983),
143 D.L.R. (3d) 764, atpp. 765-766 (N.B.Q.B.). See also Mollot v. Monnette (1981),128
D.L.R. (3d) 577, at p. 588 (S.C.C.).
140
See, supra, footnote 108 .
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In fact, historically, the defence-free position of what we call today the
holder in due course was not linked to the holder's derivative title, or to taking
the instrument by negotiation . The early authorities specifically dealt with the
insulation of the payee (to whom the billwas issued rather than negotiated) from
defences of the acceptor of the bill of exchange vis-d-vis the drawer . 149
However, following Miller v. Race,1-10 the absolute title of the bonafide holder
for value has been linked to the transferability or circulation ofthe paper. The
American Uniform Commercial Code turned the wheel back by not requiring
the holder in due course to take by negotiation; suffice it for the holder to take
the instrument in good faith, for value and without notice ofadverse facts.151 A
payee may thus be a holder in due course, so as to overcome claims anddefences
ofremote parties. 152 The specific examples given by the Official Comment are
not limited to the remitter situation, but also cover instances dealt with inLewis
v. Clay, Herdman v. Wheeler and Jones v. Waring . 153 Not only does the UCC
extend "negotiation" to cover thetransfer of an instrument by a remitter to the
141 While talking only of the payee to whom an instrument has been transferred as
eligible tobecome aholder in due course, Fletcher Moulton L.J. did notrefer explicitly to
the distinction between "issue"and "transfer", or to the fact that normally an instrument is
issued (and not transferred) to the payee . Cf., supra, text around footnotes 24-25, 68-69 .
See also, supra, footnote 105, at p. 808 . It is submitted that the distinction nevertheless
underlies his judgment.
142 See, for example, Ryder and Bueno, op. cit., footnote 40,
pp. 232-235 . Cf. Guest,
op. cit., footnote 40, pp. 338-343 . A holder for value is a holder who either gave value or
who derives his title from someone who gave value. He does not have to comply with
holding in due course requirements . See sec. 53(1) (Can.) or 27(2) (U.K.).
143 For its possible source see, supra, the text around footnotes
97-99 .
144
See, supra, the text around footnotes 72-86.
145 See,
supra, footnote 100 and sources cited there.
146 As defined, supra, the text around footnotes 63-64. In contrast, the paying party
procuring certification of a cheque is in a similar position as the remitter .
147 In any event the certification bymistake analysis ofsome Canadian courts (see, for
example, those canvassed by Crawford, op . cit., footnote 40, pp . 1794-1795), should be
rejected. Thatis,apayee-holderinduecourse(orsomebodyderivingtitlefromhim)should
be entitled to recover from a certifying bankregardless of the circumstances under which
certification was procured.
148 Cf.
the view that the certification of acheque at the holder's request discharges the
drawer's obligation and generates a new obligation of the certifying/drawee bank, as
expressed in Boyd v. Nasmith (1889), 17 O.R. 40 (Ont. C.P.D.), primarily by Street J. in
trial, at p. 41.
149 See Baker v. Lambert (1510) and Grelle v. Lambert (1513), inH. Hall (ed.), Select
Cases Concerning the Law Merchant 138 (Vol. 46, Selden Society, 1929), discussed by
F.K. Beutel, The Development ofNegotiable Instruments in Early English Law (1938), 51
Harv . L. Rev. 813, at p. 832. See also Geva, op. cit., footnote 100, p. 84.
150 (1758), 1 Burr. 452, 97 E.R. 398 (K.B.).
151 Currently, this is provided for in Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-302(a).
152 See, supra, text around footnotes 31-38 .
153 See cases no. 2, 4, and 3 respectively in Official Comment 4 to Rev . (1990), UCC
§ 3-302. See also examples c, f/g, and d/e respectively in Official Comment 2 to the pre1990 UCC § 3-302.
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payee; not only does it dispense altogether with the "negotiation" and the
derivative title elements of holding in due course; it further extends "remoteness" beyond lack of privity. 154 Under the UCC, "remoteness" also covers
absence ofdirect actual dealings giving rise tothe defence attempted tobe raised
notwithstanding the existence of formal privity. In contrast, inasmuch as the
Anglo-Canadian Act does insist on taking by negotiation, the requirement
cannot be by-passed. Vis-d-vis the acceptor of a bill of exchange, a payee may
be treated under the Anglo-Canadian Act as a holder in due course, only by
regarding the payee as having a derivative title to the acceptance, namely to the
acceptor's debt to the drawer, as if an instrument embodying the acceptance
(that is, the drawee's engagement to the drawer) has been transferred, namely
"negotiated", to the payee. Admittedly, much less imagination is required in
order to interpret "negotiation" as including the conferring of a derivative title
by the transfer of a banker's instrument from a remitter to a payee.
II. The Paying Party's Defences Against the Creditor:
Is Jus Tertii Available to the Issuing Bank?
A. The Current Law
A party who broke the contract for which that party took a negotiable
instrument cannot be a holder in due course. For the creditor who took a
banker's instrumentfrom the paying party, this is so irrespective ofwhether this
creditor is the bearer ofa banker's instrumentpayable to bearer, or the payee or
endorsee of a banker's instrument payable to order. "I Having broken the
contract with the paying party, the creditor failed to comply with the taking for
value requirement.'"' Likewise, where the breach was carried out knowingly,
the creditor cannot be saidto havetaken the instrumentin goodfaithand without
notice . Not having met the statutory requirements, the creditor may thus not be
a holder in due course. '57
One not a holder in due course holds an instrument subject to defects of
title,'"' that is, to equities attaching to it. `59 According to Chafee, such equities
are either equitable claims to ownership of a chattel or equitable defences to

See, supra, text around footnote 60.
For these variations see, supra, the text around footnotes 29-37 .
'S6
See, supra, footnote 49.
'57 See sec
. 55 (Can.) ; sec . 29 (U.K.). For holding in due course requirements see,
supra, the text around footnote 23.
'5$ This proposition, which is universally agreed to, is indicated only indirectly by the
Act. See, for example, sec . 69(1) and 71 (Can.); sec. 36(2) and (5) (U.K .). For a partial
definition of a defective title, see sec . 55(2) (Can.); 29(2) (U.K.).
159
For the interchangeability of these two terms, see, for example, Alcock v. Smith,
[1892] 1 Ch. 238, at p. 263 (C.A.). See also Guest, op. cit., footnote 40, pp. 249, 277 .
154
155

1994]

The Autonomy of the Banker's Obligation

41

liability on contract, 16o corresponding "to the duplex nature of the negotiable
instrument .. . [as] both a chattel and a chose in action" . 161
The remedy of one asserting an equity as to ownership is affirmative, and
not defensive, in the form of a claim to the instrument. The remedy of one
asserting an equity as to obligation is defensive in nature. This is so even when
it is asserted affirmatively in an attempt to enjointhe further.negotiation ofthe
instrument to aholder in due course who may take the instrument free from the
defence. 162 Statedotherwise, in anegotiableinstrument, "[t]he promises andthe
chattel are inseparable" so that "[t]he right to hold the paper and the right to
enforce the obligation are inthe same person" . 161 Hence, an equity ofownership
'affects the title to sue on the instrument. At the same time, an equity of liability
is a defence to an action on the instrument; it does not affect the title to sue on
it.
Equities of ownership are effectively adverse claims ofownership. A typical
claimant is an ex-holder suing in conversion on the basis of either theft,' or
the negotiation by his successor oftitle in breach oftrust ." Alternatively, the
ex-holder seeks either to rescind his own negotiation on the basis of fraud or
other vitiating factor, or to have this negotiation treated as totally void. 161
Insofar as title to an instrument is necessary for a successful action on it, 167 the
successful assertion of equities of ownership undermines the current holder's
160 "Equities" are claims and defences overcome by a holder in due course under the
law merchant, inasmuch as "equities" are overcome by a bona fide for value holder of a
legal title under general law :
`
161 See Z. Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper(1918), 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1104, atp.1109.
For the complex nature ofthe bill ornote as anegotiable instrument, chattel and obligation,
see A. Barak, The Nature of the Negotiable Instrument (1983), 18 Israel L. Rev. 49, a
chapter from A. Barak, The Nature of the Negotiable Instrument (1972, in Hebrew) . As
will be seen, infra, much ofthe ensuing discussionhas been strongly influenced byBarak's
excellentmonograph . For somerecentiudicialendorsement ofthis complex nature ofabill
or note, in the context of the distribution of legislative powers in Canada, see Red River
Forest Products Inc. v. Ferguson (1992), [1993] 2 W.W.R. 1, at p. 20 (Man . C.A.).
162
Chafee, ibid., at pp. 1110-1111 .
163 Chafee, ibid., at p. 1109.
164
For the defendant in possession of the instrument to be "holder", the instrument
must have been payable -to bearer .
165 As, for example, where plaintiff ex-holder had negotiated the instrument for
safekeeping to a successor in title who nevertheless negotiated it further, in defiance of
plaintiff ex-holder's instructions .
i66 On this point, see the text around footnotes 160-174.
161 Cf. sec . 138 (Can.); 59 (U.K.), implying that a defect in the holder's title is a good
defence to the holder's action. Entitlement on the instrument is included in the pre-Act
definition of"holder"inChalmers, op .cit., footnote 93, p. 3. See also the Indian Act, supra,
footnote 87, sec. 8; Parthasarathy, op . cit., footnote 88, p. 37, where entitlement to and on
the instrument is part of the definition of "holder" . But cf. Yudhisthira, Sanjiva Row's
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (9th ed.,1988), pp. 121-122, as to the interpretation of
this provision by the courts . Chafee's view, loc. cit., footnote 161, at pp. 1112-1119, that
by definition the holder has the legal title, including where he is a thief, should be rejected.
Presumably, he was overinfluenced by the analogy between equities overcome byholding
in due course under the law merchant and equities overcome bylegal titleunder the general
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title to sue on the instrument. This is not so with respect to equities ofdefences;
being defences to liability on a contract, they do not undermine the title to sue
on the instrument. 161
Accordingly, the successful assertion of equities of ownership by the
paying party against the creditor undermines the creditor's right to possess the
instrument and hence the creditor's title to sue the issuing bank. Equities of
ownership can thus be used by the paying party also as a basis for an injunction
against the issuing bank, restraining it from paying to the creditor who lacks
title. This does not apply to equities ofdefences to liability ; by themselves, not
undermining the righttopossession and hencethe title to sue onthe instrument,
they cannot be used to claim the instrument from the holderor in restraining the
obligated bank from paying the holder.
Nonetheless, in some circumstances, contractual defences may be used as
a basis to claim an instrument from its holder. This is so where such defences
are used by the innocent party to seek specific restitution from the breaching
party on the basis of the retroactive cancellation of the contract, or its extinction.'69 Thus, as against the creditor, the paying party may be entitled to
restitution on several grounds, such as total failure ofconsideration (including
where goods delivered under a contract for sale are rejected for breach of
condition),"° the rescission (or setting aside) of a voidable contract (for
example, for fraud),"' or the treatment of the contract as void ab initio (for
example, for mistake). '72 The paying party's claim in restitution reflects the
retroactive cancellation ofhis contract with the creditor, and purports to restore
the paying party to his or her pre-contractual position. At least in connection
with voidable and void contracts, the paying party's claim is for specific
restitution and not for the restitution of a sum of money by means of an action
for money had andreceived. "3 As such, itis effectively a claim for the banker's
law (see, supra, footnote 160) erroneously to equatebetween "holding" and legal title. That
is, according to Chafee, to recover, the holder musthave alegal title clear ofequities. See,
ibid., at pp. 1112-1113 .
"I
Cf. Fulton National Bank v. Delco Corp., 195 S.E. 2d 455, atp. 457 (Ga . Ct. App .,
1973), explaining that "claim", in contrast to "defense", "indicates certain rights in the
instrument on whichthe suit isbased rather thanmere reasonswhy the alleged debtoris not
liable for the fund".
"v For the distinction between retroactive cancellation and termination or discharge
see, supra, the text around footnote 40.
"o See, for example, A.G. Guest (ed.), Benjamin's Sale ofGoods (4th ed.,1992), §9016 .
"' See M.P. Furmston, Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (10th ed., 1981), pp.
253-262 .
'7z Ibid., pp.
216-228 .
'73
This is less certain in connection with cancellation on the basis of total failure of
consideration. Inasmuchasthe paying party's consent hasnotbeenvitiatedby factors such
as fraud ormistake, it can be argued that title to the banker's instrumenteffectively passed
to the creditor so thatrestitution means solely an action for money had and received. But
for specific restitution as an appropriate remedy in general for a party entitled to restitution
see, for example, G.E. Palmer, The Law ofRestitution, Vol . 1 (1978), § 4.7; with a 1982
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instrument previously given by the paying party to the creditor, so as to
constitute an equity attaching to the banker's instrument . 174
In sum, the retroactive cancellation of the contract may be used by the
paying party as an equity of ownership to preclude payment from the issuing
bank to the breaching creditor. Otherwise, contractual defences may notbe used
as grounds by the paying party to preclude such payment.
Two possible limitations on the availability of equities are noteworthy. First,
inasmuch as the paying party's rightto discharge or terminatethe contract with the
creditor on the basis of repudiation or fundamental breach does notimpinge upon
rights and obligations that have already matured; 175 consequently, the exercise of
such a right to discharge or terminate the contract by the paying party, unlike the
retroactive cancellation of the contract, does not establish an equity affecting the
banker's instrument. Second,it is notentirely certainwhetherrescission andhence
the assertion of ensuing equities of ownership is . available against a subsequent
endorsee, holder not in due course, 17' deriving title from the creditor, where such
an endorsee takes the instrument in good faith and for value. 177
So far the discussion was concerned with the ability of the paying party to
preclude payment by initiating an action to claim the instrument
to restrain
payment on the basis of the paying party's equities of ownership. It
now
be considered whether the paying party may preclude payment by the issuing
bank to the creditor by simply advising the issuing bank of the creditor's breach .

or

will

The right or duty 178 of a party sued on a negotiable instrument by a holder
not in due course 179 to meet the action by asserting equities of another (that is,

Pocket Supplement and a 1992 Supplement . See also Restatement of the Law Second,
Contract 2d (1981), § 372. Available English authorities provide for specific restitution
only where damages do not provide an adequate remedy. See, for example, Duke of
Somerset v. Cookston (1735),3 P. Wms. 390,24 E.R . 1114 (L.C .); Dowling v. Betjemann
(1862), 2 J. & H. 544, 70 E.R . 1175 (V .-C.) . Note however that damages could be
inadequate in connection with the banker's instrument, where the alternative to specific
restitution is payment to thebreaching party (creditor) followed by an action for damages
by the paying party! In any event, for the availability of equitable remedies to seize the
banker's instrument from afraudulent creditor,see, forexample, Shupack, op. cit., footnote
15, at pp . 476-478.
174
Having recovered the instrument from the creditor;the paying party may recover
from the issuing bank. See, in general, supra, the text around footnotes 66-67.
Its
For this point, see Furmston, op . cit., footnote 171, p. 491 .
176
For example, where the holder took an overdue instrument.
177
A buyer of chattels from a seller with a voidable title gets clear title where (i) the
seller's title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, and (ii) the buyer acted in good
faith and withoutnotice of the seller's defective title . See, for example, the Sale of Goods
Act, R.S .O . 1990, c. S-1, sec. 24. Whether this doctrine applies to bills and notes, or
whether it is superseded altogether by the holder in due course doctrine is a difficult
question not to be determined here .
178
It may be a duty towards the equity owner, in the sense that the failure to raise the
equity may charge the party sued on the instrument with liability to the equity owner.
179
Obviously, a holder in due course takes the instrument free from -all equities,
including those of a third party. For rights of a holder in due course see, supra, the text
around footnote 21 .
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third) party has been discussed in the law ofbills and notes asjus terth .'$° In
our context, the question is whether the issuing bank is either entitled or obliged
to meet the creditor's claim by setting up equities of the paying party arising
from the breach of contract by the creditor . By paying over such equities, does
the bank incur liability to the paying party?

The Anglo-Canadian Act does not deal directly with the fits tertii issue ."'
In the literature the most comprehensive discussions ... are by Britton's3 and
Barak.'s 4 According to Barak,'ss jus tertii is available to a defendant sued on a
bill or note, provided it is based on equity of ownership and not liability.
Payment to the holder with knowledge of third party's equities of ownership
does not discharge the instrument and renders the payor liable to the third party
equity owner. Barak relies on pre-Act cases, Chalmers' view, and the interpretation
of the Act. According to Britton, the statutory provisions are not conclusive.
The pre-Act cases areBellv. LordIngestre's6 andLloydv.Howard. 187 They
not
involve banker's instruments . In both cases, the acceptor was sued by
did
endorsee
holder not in due course and in each case, the acceptor had no
an
equities of his own. In the first case, the plaintiff holder did not perform a
condition precedent agreed upon between him and his own endorser. As a
result, that endorser had an equity of ownership in the bill. In the second case,
the plaintiff holder acquired the bill other than as a holder in due course from
an endorsee who had endorsed it to the plaintiff in breach oftrust vis-d-vis that
endorser's predecessor. As a result, that endorser's predecessor had an equity
of ownership in the bill. In both cases, the acceptor successfully defended the
plaintiff's action on the basis ofthe third person's equities. In reference tothese
two cases, Chalmers' conclusions,"' even after the Act, was that whenever an
iso (Or Ius Terth) . So far as I can tell, in this context, the expression was first coined
inChalmers, op. cit., footnote 93, pp. 44,75 and 185. Itwas carried over to the 13thedition,
op. cit., footnote 96, pp. 61, 102, 108 and 201 . The omission of the term in the current
edition (Guest, op. cit., footnote 40), is unfortunate as it may serve to downplay the issue.
'st Though it may be interpreted to deal indirectly with the issue. See, infra, the text
around footnotes 190-199.
's2
Besides Britton, op. cit ., footnote 66, and Barak, op. cit., footnote 161, see also
Malan, op. cit., footnote 33, para. 216-217, and in greater detail F.R. Malan, Payment in
Due Course and the 'Ins Tertii' in South African Law, [1989] J.I.B.L. 24.
iss Ibid., pp. 462-477 . Britton discussed the question under the American Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, the predecessor of UCC Article 3, which derived from the
English Act .
"'The question was discussed most comprehensively in Barak's monograph, op. cit.,
footnote 161, pp. 63-68 (see also pages 48, 62, 71, 73,121 and 151). Some ofthe analysis
appears (in English) in his earlier article, The Uniform Commercial Code - Commercial
Paper . An Outsider's View, Part I (1968), 3 Israel L. Rev . 7, at pp. 21-26 .
iss Between the two, Barak's analysis is the more relevantunder the Anglo-Canadian
Act.
iss (1848), 12 Q.B. 318, 116 E.R. 888 .
18'
(1850), 15 Q.B. 995, 117 E.R. 735 .
iss For the same opinion by Chalmers also prior to the Act see, op. cit., footnote 93,
p. 74.
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instrument is held adversely to the true owner, a third party sued on it may set
up jus tertii against a holder not in due course .119
So far as availability of the jus tertii defence under the Act is concerned,
both Barak' 9° and Britton"' rely on the section' 92 providing that a bill is
discharged by "payment in due course", namely payment made "to the .holder
.. . in good faith and without notice that his title ... [to the bill] is defective". It
follows from this language that a payment made with notice of the plaintiff's
defective title will not constitute a discharge. True, plaintiff's title could be
defective on the basis of equities belonging either to the defendant or to athird
party; however, as to defendant's payment with knowledge ofhis ownequities,
"[t]here would benopoint to a statute which told an obligorthat ifhe paid a debt
to which he=had a defense that his waiver thereof was not binding". 193 It thus
follows that the sectionspeaks ofthirdparty's equities, that is,jus tertii ; and that
it effectively allows the defendant to defend plaintiff-holder's claim by setting
upthatjus tertii. That is, ifdefendant does not get a discharge forpayment made
with knowledge of third party's equities, defendant may not be compelled to
make such a payment. Hence, third party's equities are available to the
defendant as a defence.
Nonetheless, according to Britton, this may not be conclusive ."' Against
the availability of jus tertii, he cites"' the section"' whose Anglo-Canadian
counterpart entitles a holder to enforce a bill against any party except for any
infant, minor or corporation "having no capacity orpower to incurliability"."'
As well, he cites the section providing for the right of a party liable on a bill to
pay in disregard of any condition to an endorsement. "' In Britton's view, these
provisions suggest that lack of capacity, and the existence of a condition to an
endorsement, as third party's equities do not affect the holder's right to enforce
payment.
These arguments are convincingly rejected by Barak. 199 In his opinion, the
former provision is oflimited application (namely it is confined to the defence
See, for example, Chalmers (13th ed.), op. cit., p, 102. For the omission from the
current edition see, the reference, footnote 180.
190
Op . cit., footnote 161. He alsorelies on sec. 55(2) (Can.); sec.29(2) (U.K.), defining
"defect of title" in terms which do not exclude third party's equities .
191 Op .
cit., footnote 66, p. 467. He also relies on N.I.L., sec. 59 (deriving from sec.
57(2) (Can.); 30(2) (U.K.), butusing a modified language that presupposes availability of
equities established subsequent to liability by the defendant.
192
Sec. 138 (Can .); 59 (U .K .).
193
Britton, op. cit., footnote 66, p. 467.
191 Ibid., p. 468. Heavy reliance was put on American pre-N.I.L. cases.
19s
Ibid., pp. 464-466, 469-471.
196 N
.I.L., sec. 22. See also thepreclusions ofparties liable on an instrument under sec.
60-62.
19'
Sec. 47 (Aan.); 22(2) (U.K.). See also the preclusion of parties liable on an
instrument under sec. 185, 129, 132 (Can .); 88, 55 and 54 (U.K.).
198 N
.I.L., sec. 39, corresponding to sec. 65 (Can.); 33 (U.K.).
199 Op.
cit., footnote 161, pp. 64-66 .
lag
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of absence of capacity), may speak solely of the transferability of the bill
notwithstanding the incapacity of the transferor (who is therefore not liable on
the bill), and by negative implication, may indicate that otherwise jus tertii is
available . As for the latter provision, it does not entitle the holder to recover on
the bill notwithstanding the non-fulfilment of the condition ; nor does it require
the defendant to disregard the condition . Rather, it allows the defendant, at his
discretion, to decide whether to disregard the condition or to refuse payment.
That is, the defendant is free to raise the non-fulfilment of the condition as a
defence to the action .
As to the scope ofjus tertii, if available to a defendant as a defence to the
holder's action, Britton seems to speak only of the availability of third party's
equities ofownership, not ofliability ." Barakis even more explicit, and further
providesfor arationale. Inhis view,2°'jus tertiipleais not adefence to the merits
ofplaintiff's action.2°2 Rather, it is a challenge to plaintiff's standing to sue . A
defendant raising the plea, ineffect, argues that plaintiff, having adefective title
to the instrument, may not succeed in the actton2°s notwithstanding that plaintiff
is the holder.204 That is, the defendant effectively pleads that "he promised to
pay the . .. [instrument] only to the owner of it, and his promise, therefore, does
not run to the plaintiff % 2 °s Accordingly, for the defendant to succeed in raising
ajus tertii plea, third party's equities must be those of ownership; 2°6 third party's
contractual defences, unless they are effectively used to cancel the contract
retroactively,2°' will not suffice . That is, only grounds for third party's
intervention2°$ will justify the assertion of his rights in absentia .
In sum, the better view seems to be that underthe Act, third party's equities
ofownership (jus tertit), including those based on the retroactive cancellation
z°° Britton, op. cit., footnote 66, pp. 466, 468 .
tot Op. Cit., footnote 161, pp. 67-68 (monograph) .
21 But, as Barakpoints out there, this is notBritton's position . Britton asserts (op. cit.,
footnote 66, pp. 186-187), that wherejus tertii is raised against aholder, "justasinthe case
of the defendant who sets up a defence of his own, the plaintiff is the holder", implying
thereby that the availability ofjus tertii is a question of the existence ofa defence against
the proper plaintiff rather than that ofa standing.
201
For title as necessary element for a successful action on an instrument see, supra,
the text around footnote 168.
204
Who may thus sue (but not necessarily successfully) on the instrument. See sec.
73(a) (Can.); 38(1) (U.K.).
zos W.E. Hawkland, Commercial Paper (1959), p. 91 .
sob Barak's monograph,
op. cit., footnote 161, pp. 67-68, uses the following example
to demonstrate the unavailability ofthirdparty's equities ofdefences. Suppose A. drew on
B. abillpayable to C. B.'s acceptance was procured byfraud. C. negotiated the bill to D.
who tookitwith knowledge ofthe fraud sothat D. cannot be a holder in due course . In this
case, B.has an equity asto liability but is not an adverseclaimant to the instrument; at most
B. isentitledtoreceive the instrumenttemporarily, in orderto cancel his signature . If, when
sued by D., A. is allowed to raise B.'s jus tertii, A. may end up being liable to nobody!
2°' Therefore, where the jus tertiiis based onthe voidability ofthe contractgivingrise
to the equity, defendant must prove that the contract has been properly disaffirmed . See
Chalmers (13th ed .), op. cit ., footnote 96, p. 106.
208
See, supra, the text around footnotes 169-177 .
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of the underlying contract; but not equities of defences to liability, can be used
not only by the equity owner to preclude payment on the instrument (along the
lines of Barak's analysis); they can also form a defence to an action on the
instrument against the party liable . The failure to raise aknownjustertii defence
would expose the party liable to an action by the adverse claimant (equity
owner) .
Finally, there is the question of standard of proof. Perhaps it canbe argued,
on the basis of the law of letters of credit in Canada, that in order to obtain an
interlocutory injunction restraining the issuing bank from making payment on
a banker's instrument, "[a] strong primafaciecase of ... [equities]""' must be
made by. the paying party. On the other hand, where payment has been made,
to avoid liabilityforpaying with knowledge of thirdparty's equities, the issuing
bank must prove that notice210 of adverse equities did not make them "clear or
obviousto the bark" .211 Thehigher standard in the latter case canbe rationalized
on the basis of -"the strict obligation of the issuing bank to .. . [pay upon
presentment] " as well as on "the fact that the decision as to whetheror not to pay
must .. . be made fairly promptly" and on "the difficulty in many cases of forming
an opinion, on which one would hazard a lawsuit" 212
.

UCC Article 3 - A Modelfor Reform?

Subject to narrow exceptions, the drafters of the American UCC opted
against the availability of the jus tertii defence against an action on a bill or
note ." 3 The starting point of the Code is notdifferent from that of theAct. Thus,
under the pre-1990 Official Text, a holder in due course was stated to hold the
instrument subject to "all valid claims to it on the part of any' person", as well
as to "all defenses of any party which wouldbe available in an action on a simple
contract"."' These categories correspond to equities of ownership andequities
of liability 2'5 So far as jus tertii was concerned, it was stated in pre-1990 UCC
§ 3-306(d) that a holder not in due course .takes the instrument subject to "the
defense that he or a person through whom he holds the instrument acquired it
by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to such holder would be inconsistent
Bank ofNova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd. (1987), 36 D.L.R . (4th) 161, at p.
177 (S .C .C .) (LeDain J.) .
210 In
general, disqualifying notice must be actual, consisting either of actual knowledge or of a suspicion coupled with a wilful disregard of the means of knowledge. See
Guest, op . cit., footnote 40, pp . 274, 492.
21'
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., supra, footnote 209, at p. ,177.
212 Ibid ., at . , 177-178.
pp
213
Curiously, Comment5 of pre-1990 UCC § 3-306 suggests continuity of the "same
policy" maintained under the N.I.L., notwithstanding the ambiguity or even controversy
(as indicated, supra, in text around footnotes 190-199) .
214
Pre-1990 UCC § 3-306(a) and (b). (Emphasis added) . See also §§ 3-306(c) and
3-408 as to the defences of want and failure of consideration.
215 This waspointedout by W.D . Warren, Cutting OffClaims of Ownership Under the
UniformCommercial Code (1963), 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, note 3. It is consistent with the
preceding analysis, supra, the text .around footnotes 158-168.
209
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with the terms of a restrictive endorsement". However, except for that
defence(relating either to theft or restrictive endorsement), it was then stated
that "[t]he claim of any third person to the instrument is not ... available as a
defense to any party liable ... [on the instrument] unless the thirdperson himself
defends the action for such party"?'6 That is, unlike under the Act, subject to
the theft and restrictive endorsement exceptions, third person's "claims",
namely equities ofownership, are not available in an action against a holder not
in due course, unless the equities' owner "defends the action" for the party
liable .
Pre-1990 UCC § 3-603(1) purported tomirror this provision by eliminating
the "payment in due course" concept."" Thus, subject to the theftand restrictive
endorsement exceptions, "[t]he liability ofany party is discharged to the extent
of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with
knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument". 211 Discharge for
such a payment was stated to be denied where prior to such payment or
satisfaction (that is, with knowledge of the adverse claim), the adverse claimant
"either supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge
or enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court ofcompetent jurisdiction
in an action in which the adverse claimant and the holder are parties". That is,
the provision allowed the adverse claimant to preclude payment not only by
initiating an action (the second option), but also by supplying indemnity (the
first option) . It thus allowed the assertion ofjus tertii other than with respect to
theft and restrictive endorsement, not only under compulsion by means of an
order prohibiting payment (or in connection with an action to which the adverse
claimant is joined), but also against indemnity, though at the choice ofthe party
liable, in whose eyes the indemnity supplied by the adverse claimant must be
"deemed adequate" . In sum, except in connection with theft and restrictive
endorsement, inaction by the third party adverse claimant would not allow the
defendant to raise the third party's adverse claim as a defence . Injunction or
participation in the action by the third party adverse claimant compels the
defendant to raise the third party's adverse claim. Indemnity supplied by the
third party would be the equivalent of an injunction, but only where it was
"deemed adequate" by the party liable . Payment over jus tertii, made over an
unsatisfactory indemnity (but not over an injunction or satisfactory indemnity)
discharges the instrument.
The effective retroactive cancellation of the contract by the paying party,
onthe basis ofthat party's contract defences against the creditor, does establish
a "claim" (that is, an equity of ownership) in the paying party's hands 219
(Emphasis added).
See Comment I topre-1990UCC § 3-603 . For the "paymentin due course" concept
in force under the Anglo-Canadian Act see, supra, the text around footnotes 190-193 .
218 (Emphasis added) .
219 See, supra, the text around footnotes
169-174 . For a previous discussion by this
author underthe UCC,seeB. Geva, Contractual Defensesas Claims totheInstrument: The
Right to Block Payment On a Banker's Instrument (1979), 58 Or. L. Rev . 283 .
216
217
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Otherwise, neither § 3-306(d) nor § 3-603(1) of the pre-1990 UCC specifically
addressed the availability of third party's "defences" (other than "claims"),
namely of equities of liability. It was argued2211 that thescheme was open to three
alternative interpretations: (1) "claims" included "defences" (so that third
party's "defences" were not available other than where the third party either
took part in the litigation or supplied indemnity) ; (2) third party's "defences"
other than "claims" may be asserted by the party liable, even without the third
party's participation or indemnity; or (3) third party's "defences" other than
"claims" may not be raised by, the party liable, even where the third party
participated in the litigation. The first interpretation overlooks the "claims/
defences" dichotomy which is premised on the fundamental distinction between equities of ownership and equities of liability. Between the second and
third option, the latter is the more plausible. It is more consistent with the preUCC background of the issue,221 and the UCC's trend in restricting thejus tertii
plea . Thus, in the final analysis, third party "defences" other than "claims" may
notbe raised by theparty's liable ; this could not be overridenby the thirdparty
either supplying indemnity or joining in the action .
The revised (1990) Article 3 reiterates the subjection of a holder not in due
course to claims and defences . In some respects it even uses more explicit
language, but without introducing substantive changes on this point. . First, it
specifically speaks of the holder's subjection to "a claim of a property or
possessory right in the instrument or its proceeds"."' This corresponds to
"equity of ownership", including on the basis of the rescission of the contract.
Second, so far as "equities of liability" are concerned, the holder not in due
course is stated to be subject to any contract defence 21 as well as to "a claim in
recoupment of the obligor against the original payee of the instrumenf'arising
from the transaction giving rise to the instrument .22A Such "claims" do fall into
thebroadercategory of contract defences ; they are pleas fordamages forbreach
of contract, that could have been pursued in an action against the breaching
party, but may be asserted defensively to reduce the amount owing in the action
on theinstrument ." So far, this is in fact arestatement of theposition under the
pre-1990 Official Text, though with some clarifications .
11 B .A. Blum, The Use of Jus Tertii Defenses By an Obligor On a Negotiable
Instrument (1979), 84 Com. L.J . 131.
221
Cf., supra, the text around footnotes 200-208.
222 Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-306.
223
Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-305(a)(2) . The specific reference to want and failure of
consideration (pre-1990 UCC §§ 3-306(c) and 3-408, supra, footnote 5) has been deleted.
224 Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-305(a)(3) .
15 Ibid. Comment 3. According to W.H . Loyd, The Development of Set-Off(1916),
64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, at p. 563, recoupment is "the right to present in opposition to the
plaintiff's claim, for its reduction or extinguishment, a right of action in the defendant for
loss or damage sustained by him in the same transaction through ... [the other party's]
breach of contract or duty". For the broad scope of contract defences, to include those
arising where "[e]ach party ... [to the contract] has done wrong ... [so that] each is entitled
to a remedy, although there must be an adjustment of remedies", see, for example, A.L.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1952), § 896. _
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However, the policy against the availability of the jus tertii defence in an
action on the instrument is not only clarified but is also expanded in the 1990
Official Text. The principal provision is § 3-305(3)(c) . Its basic rule is that in
an action to enforce liability on an instrument, "the obligor may not assert ... a
defense, claim in recoupment, or claim ... [of a property or possessory right] to
the instrument .. . of another person". Two exceptions are specifically enumerated. First, "the other person's claim to the instrument may be asserted by the
obligor ifthe otherperson isjoined inthe action and personally asserts the claim
against the person entitled to enforce the instrument" . Second, as against one
not holder in due course, "[a]n obligor is not obliged to pay the instrument if .. .
the obligor proves that the instrument is a lost or stolen instrument"? 26

This scheme is further reinforced by § 3-602. Thereunder, "the obligation
... to pay the instrument is discharged even though payment is made with
knowledge of a claim to the instrument ... by another person"22' No discharge
will be given only where "payment is made with knowledge by the payor that
payment is prohibited by injunction or similar process of a court of competent
jurisdiction' .228 In the case of a banker's instrument, the obligated bank is not
privileged to withhold payment on the basis of an indemnity supplied by the
adverse claimant." Furthermore, the wrongful withholding of payment on a
banker's instrument may entitle the holder, under UCC § 3-411(b) not only "to
compensation forexpensesand lossofinterest resulting fromthe non-payment",
but also to the recovery from the obligated bank of consequential damages . 230
In sum, revised Article 3 reinforces the antijus tertii policy of its predecessor by clarifying that only thirdparty's equities ofownership may beraised, and
only where the third party isjoined in the action . Furthermore, the antijus tertii
policy is expanded by the elimination of two exceptions: that ofthe restrictive
endorsement, and more notedly, that of the obligated bank's privilege to
withhold payment against satisfactory indemnity supplied by the adverse
claimant. On the other hand, the theft exception was retained . In fact, it was
expanded to cover loss ofphysical possession not followed by the theft of the
instrument.
Underboth the UCC and the Anglo-Canadian Act, the distinction between
equities of ownership and equities of liability is thus of paramount importance .
Under both statutes, equities of ownership include equities generated by the
effective retroactive cancellation of the contract for which the instrument was
given. Under both statutes, the paying party, as an adverse claimant, may
precludepayment onabanker's instrumentonthe basis ofequities ofownership
but not equities of liability .
(Emphasis added).
Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-602(a) . (Emphasis added).
228
Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-602(b)(i) .
229
Rev. (1990), UCC § 3-602(b)(ii) .
230
However, consequential damages are recoverable only "if the obligated bankrefuses
to pay after receiving notice ofparticular circumstances giving rise to the damages" .
226
227
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Under both the UCC and the Anglo-Canadian Act, the obligated bank
cannot defend an action on a banker's' instrument by pleading equities of
defences to liability belonging to the paying party. The paying party may
neither initiate nor be joined in the action against the obligated bank231 on the
basis of such equities . However, the two statutes are polarized as to the
availability ofthe paying party's equities of ownership in an action by one not
holder not in due course against the obligated bank to which the paying party is
hot joined. Such equities are allowed under the Anglo-Canadian Act but, with
the exception of a stolen or, lost instrument, not under the UCC.

C. Some Policy Considerations

Undoubtedly, the departure ofthe UCC from the position still maintained
by the Anglo-Canadian Act reflects the views ofBritton .232 He advances several
arguments against the position under which the jus tertii defence is available in
an action to which the adverse claimant is not a party 233 These arguments can
be set out as follows : 234
(1) The availability ofjus tertii undermines the attainment ofdischarge by
the payor :
even without action againsthim, apartyto a billornote who has beencalled upon
for payment should be allowed to discharge it by payment to the holder despite
the fact that the payor knows the holder has a defective title. The payor should
be allowed to terminate the running of interest : [235] His credit is adversely
affected by the circulation of instrument after maturity ."'
Indeed, in ascheme wherejus tertii is not available (forexample, under
the UCC), the party liable may pay the holder and obtain discharge
without assessing information known to him or her23' as to the quality
of the holder's title . Conversely, where jus tertii is available (for
example, in Canada), payment to the holder may be upset by the
adverse claimant .
231
Obviously the paying party has a cause of action against the breaching creditor on
the basis of the equities of defences ; but this does not preclude payment by the obligated
bank to the creditor.
232 Op .
cit., footnote 66 . (See Malan, op. cit., footnote 182, p. 25).

233 Ibid ., pp . 468-469.

234 F
or Britton's concession as to the theft exception see, infra, the text around
footnotes 249-254.
235
This particular pointmay notbe applicable to the banker's instrumentunder which
theobligated bankis notliablefor interest . Onthe contrary, having been paid bythe paying
customer, the obligated bank may wish to hold the funds. Nonetheless, the ensuing
sentence is undoubtedly applicable to the obligated bank. Cf. the discussion, infra, in
paragraph containing footnote 247.
236
Britton, op. cit., footnote 66, p. 468.
237
But note that even where jus tertii is available the party liable incurs no duty to
investigate where there is neither knowledge nor suspicion of a defect of title.
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(2) While payment without knowledge of any defect in the holder's title
discharges the payor's payment obligation23s wherejus tertii is available,
such payment does not preclude a subsequent action by the adverse
claimant against the payor, in whichthe adverse claimant alleges knowledge of a defect oftitle by the payor at the time ofpayment. The burden
ofproving lackofknowledge ison the payor.239 A payorwho fails to meet
the burden of proof may end up paying twice24°
Where jus tertii is available, having knowledge or suspicion of some
adverse facts but not being convinced that the holder has a defective
title, apayor may enduppaying atthe risk ofbeingheld, in a subsequent
suit against him brought by the adverse claimant, to have paid in bad
faith . The payor thus incurs the riskofdouble payment ."' Itwould not
matter if the first payment to the holder was made in satisfaction of a
judgment obtainedbythe holder since the adverse claimant, not having
been a party to the litigation, is not bound by that judgment.' The
failure ofthe payor to prove adverse claim in the first action (brought
bythe holder) does not preclude the adverse claimantfrom establishing
such a claim in the second action (brought against the payor).

(4) Where jus tertii is available, aparty liable on an instrument may end up
asserting a defence based on a right belonging to someone who is not
interested in raising it. Stated otherwise, "the disposition ofthe equity
of ownership is personal to the owner and it should not be the subject
of adjudication in any litigation which will not be binding upon such
equity owner" ."' That is, the defendant should not be allowed to
override waiver by the third party to whom the equities belong .
Britton's views are not shared by Barak who supports the traditional
position (as still maintained under the Anglo-Canadian Act) allowing a defendant to raise jus terth in an action by the holder to which the adverse claimant
is not aparty.244 In Barak's opinion, the danger ofdouble payment is not serious .
Furthermore, precluding the defendant from raising jus tertii does not lead .to
absolute finality of payment 245 A s well, unavailability of jris tertii leads to
Regardless of whether jus tertii is available or not.
This may be aheavy burden for alarge organization payor, incircumstances where
some knowledge was acquired by someone .
Zoo Following such a double payment, thepayor will sue the holder (to whom he paid
first) in restitution .
24'
"If the instrument has years to run, the same problems repeat themselves with
respect to periodic interest payments", Britton, op . cit ., footnote 66, p. 468 . But this
problem does not arise with respect to the banker's instrument.
242
Quaere as to whether the firstjudgment forcing the payor to pay the holder will not
bar the payor's claim against the holder in restitution, following the second judgment
compelling the payor to pay the adverse claimant.
243
Britton, op . cit ., footnote 66, p. 469.
244
See, supra, footnote 184.
245 "Finality ofPayment" denotes here an absence of right in restitution . For the use
of the term in this sense see, for example, pre-1990 UCC § 3-418 .
238
239
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multiplicity of actions and does not encourage fair dealing in commercial life.
With respect, at least in the narrow context of the three participants in the
banker's instrument transaction (namely the paying party, the obligated bank
andthe creditor) ,246 1 am not convinced by Barak's arguments. My reservations
with respect to each of the four points made by Barak are set out below.
To begin with, where jus tertii is available, the only safe method for the
obligated- bank to avoid double payment is to withhold payment to the holder
whenever it receives any adverse information that may affect the holder's title .
This however may be detrimental to the reputation of the bank in the eyes of
potential holders, andmay force the bank into litigation (initiated by the holder)
in which it is not the real party in interest . Indeed, payment by the bankto the
holder notwithstanding knowledge of adverse information may equally be
detrimental to the reputation of the bank in the eyes ofcustomers and potential
paying parties, as well as force the bank into litigation (initiated by the
customer) in which it is not the realparty in interest.' Nonetheless, the utility
ofthe banker's instrument as a substitute for cash may be seriously undermined
by a consistent policy of withholding payment. Hence, the risk of double
payment is not peripheral.
The second objection to disallowing jus tertii raised by Barak's that in any
event, preclusion does not leadto complete finality ofpayment. Indeed, also where
jus tertiiis unavailable (for instance, under the IJeC), payment by the obligated
bankto the holdermay not lead to absolute finality since the holder is nevertheless
exposed to the paying party's action asserting equities of ownership. Preclusion
thus achieves merepartial finality. However, this overlooks the fact thatwherejus
tertii is unavailable, so faras the payor is concerned, that party receives an absolute
discharge and is not involved inthe subsequent litigation between the paying party
and the holder. In this respect, the payor's payment effectively achieves finality .
Stated otherwise, wherejus tertii is unavailable, absolute discharge received by the
payor should not be outweighedby the achievement ofmerepartial finality . Infact,
wherejus tertii is available, so that absolute discharge is obviously not achieved,
even partial finality does not exist!
Third, there is the argument ofmultiplicityofactions. Thus, whetherjus tertii
is available ornot, liability is ultimately fastened onthe breaching creditor. Where
jus tertii is allowed (for example, under the Anglo-Canadian Act), this may be
achieved as a result of one lawsuit, brought by the creditor against the obligated
bank, in which judgment is given against the creditor on the basis ofthe paying
party's equities asserted by the obligated bank. Conversely, wherejus tertii may
not be raised (for example, under the UCC), two lawsuits may be necessary. The
first is by the creditor against the obligated bank, in whichjudgment is given for
the creditor . The second lawsuit is by the paying party against the creditor for
246
Tus tertii policy analysis by both Barak and Britton is general, that is, not in the
specific context of the banker's instrument.
247
Nonetheless, such litigation willbe avoided where the paying party chooses to sue
the creditor(on the breach) and notthe issuing bank(thatpaidthecreditor notwithstanding
knowledge of adverse information on the wrongful payment).
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breach of contract. At first blush, the unavailability ofjus tertii thus generates
multiplicity of actions . Nonetheless,inpractice, wherejus tertii is not available,
it is unlikely that the creditor will be forced to bring a lawsuit in orderto recover
from the obligated bank. It is more likely that the obligated bank will pay the
creditor on mere demand. Hence, whether jus tertii is permitted or not, liability
willbe fastened on thebreaching creditor following one lawsuit248 The advantage
of the UCC scheme is then that wherejus tertii is available, litigation is between
the real parties to the dispute (namely the paying parry and the creditor).
Finally, there is the argument of fair commercial dealing . In Barak's
opinion, arule that requires payment to a holder known tohave a defective title
does not encourage fair dealing in commercial life. This, however, overlooks
the fact that the paying party is given full opportunity to preclude payment by
initiating the litigation . A rule which does not permitjus tertii does not bypass
the concerns of the innocent paying party; the rule merely does not allow the
paying party to sit on the fence and avoid litigation on his or her own equities .
The rule protects the obligated bank but not atthe expense ofthe paying party .
Inasmuch as the innocent paying party mayeffectively preclude payment to the
breaching creditor, no unfair dealing in commercial life is encouraged. To
enhance fairness, the law should be amended to allow a paying party, who has
notified the obligated bank of his equities, a short period of time to bring his
orher lawsuit . During that briefperiod, payment by the obligated bank should
not be allowed . This amendment could easily be implemented in a scheme
disallowing jus tertii .
In the final analysis, at least with respect to the banker's instrument,
Britton's policy analysis is more appealing to me than that of Barak. The
position under the Act, under which ajus tertii plea is available to a party sued
on the instrument is thus inconsistent with the better policies .
Nonetheless, against a thief or one deriving title from a thief, even Britton
would allow the party liable to plead jus tertii249 Agreeing with Chafee210 that
"the thiefwould have no standing in court, on grounds of public policy",251 he
cites "a fatal weakness in ... [the thief's] own case"252 as the "special reason" 253
248 Indeed, under the Anglo-Canadian Act, as against a hypothetical issuing bank
acting in bad faith, the paying party may be forced to bring an action, following the
judgmentgiven in favour of the issuing bank against the creditor. Hence, where the issuing
bank wrongfully refuses to makepayment, two actions are required under boththeAngloCanadian and UCC schemes.
249
Op. cit., footnote 66, pp. 471-473 . Note that Britton argues for this position
notwithstanding the fact that he adheres to Chafee's view, (loc. cit., footnote 161) not
shared by the present author, as to the legal title of the thief-holder.
210 For Chafee's position as to
the availability of the jus tertii defence against a thiefholder, notwithstanding the latter's legal title, see Chafee, ibid., at p. 1115. In essence,
Chafee, ibid., argues that "thethiefwould haveno standing incourt, ongrounds ofillegality
and public policy ... Once the thief gets into the purview ofjustice, the criminal law cuts
across the lave ofproperty and nullifies the advantages of his legal title".
251
Britton, op. cit., footnote 66, p. 472 .
252 Ibid., p. 473 .
11 Ibid., p. 472.
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underlying this exception 2 54 This view, which was adopted by the UCC,z55 i s
however not universally shared, even by those adhering toBritton's general anti
jus tertii policy grounds .256 However, this point as to the theft exception to the
unavailability ofjus tertii will not be explored further here as it is outside the
scope of the present inquiry.
In sum, the title to a bill or note of one not holder in due course is subject
to equities ofownership ofthird parties. The paying party's claimto a banker's
instrument on the basis of the effective retroactive cancellation of the contract
with the creditor is such an equity. UndertheAnglo-CanadianAct such equities
may form the ground of a defence by the obligated bank, even where the paying
party is not joined in the litigation . It is the latter aspect which may not be
justifiable on policy grounds. Revision along the lines ofthe UCC (disallowing
jus tertii unless the third party is joined on the action) is highly recommended.
Several improvements couldnonetheless be seriously considered. First, whether
total failure of consideration is an equity of ownership should be specifically
determined .257 Second, the effect of termination or discharge, as opposed to the
retroactive cancellation of the contract, should be clarified.258 Third, the
position regarding the availability of rescission (and hence ensuing equities of
ownership) against a bona fide for value subsequent endorsee holder not in due
course should also be clarified 259 Fourth, apaying party advising the obligated
bank ofequities ofownership should be afforded a briefperiod to submit his or
her action, during which the banker's instrument may not be paid.210 Finally, the
justificationforallowing jus tertii based ontheft or loss ofthe instrument should
be reconsidered. 261

254 Conversely, according to Britton,, ibid., p. 474, "[t]he position of the finder is
stronger than that of the thiefbecause, in many cases he is guilty ofno crime, a fact which
could well be used to counterbalance the lack of voluntary delivery to him". Hence,
according to Briton, against a finder (as opposed to a thief), jus tertii ought not to be
available.
251 Except that contrary to Britton, ibid ., the Revised (1990), Official Text expanded
the availability ofthejus tertii defence tocover loss (and not only theft). Theposition under
the UCC is discussed, supra, the text around footnotes 213-231 .
256 See, for example, Blum, loc. cit., footnote 220, at p. 141 . - Acknowledging that
"there is nothing attractive about aiding a thief', he nonetheless cannot find it "less
attractive than aiding anyotherperson whohas acquired theinstrument under dishonest or
otherwise questionable circumstances". Accordingly, he would prefer a consistent rule
disallowingjus terti i (even against a thief), so as to eliminate altogether the theftexception.
257 See, supra, the text around footnote 170.
258 See, supra, the text around footnote 175 .
259 See, supra, the text around footnotes 176-177.
260 See, supra, the conclusion ofthe paragraph following the one containing footnote
248.
261 See, supra, the text around footnotes 249-256.
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Conclusion

In the hands of a remote holder in due course ,262 a banker's instrument is held
free from the banker's defences against the paying party as well as from the
paying party's claims and defences against the creditor. In turn, a creditorpayee acting in good faith and without adverse knowledge qualifies as a holder
in due course so as to overcome the banker's defences against the creditor . At
the same time, a creditor-payee in breach ofcontractwith the paying party is not
eligible to become a holder in due course.
Nevertheless, even if not a holder in due course, the payee-creditor holds
the instrument free from the paying party's contract defences, other than those
used by the paying party as claims for specific restitution on the basis of the
retroactive cancellation of the contract between the paying party and the
creditor . In turn, under the Anglo-Canadian Act, such claims are available to
the obligated bank in an action by one not holder in due course, even where the
paying party does not use these claims as a basis to an action to enjoin the
obligated bank from making payment . Notification to the obligated bank by the
paying party of a claim against the payee-creditor is sufficient .
In connection with the banker's instrument, autonomy is thus partially
achieved. Indeed, the full implementation of autonomy with respect to the
banker's defences is consistent with equity considerations . At the same time,
the partial autonomy with respect to the paying party's defences (that is, its
inapplicability to claims) reflects the ambivalent policies pertaining to the cash
equivalence ofthe banker's instrument.263

262 Namely someone who is not aparty to the original dealings between the issuing
bank and the paying party or between the paying party and the creditor.
263
gee, supra, the paragraph containing footnotes 14-15.

